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INTRODUCTION 
As a choice of entity, the limited liability company (LLC) shows great 
promise. It combines the flexibility of a contract-based form such as a partner-
ship and the limited liability of a state-created form such as a corporation. The 
LLC ostensibly represents a triumph of freedom of contract in business law. 
The form is a product of statute, but the LLC is a creature of contract. The use-
fulness of the form, however, has been limited by continuing legal uncertainty. 
Despite the first LLC statute being passed in 1977,1 the form is young relative 
to its competitors, and there remains a shocking paucity of case law. 
This legal uncertainty has not prevented tremendous growth in the utiliza-
tion of the LLC. Integral to early growth was a 1988 revenue ruling by the In-
ternal Revenue Service that removed the requirement of personal liability for 
partnership tax status.2 By the mid-1990s, the LLC was supplanting the corpo-
ration as the form of choice for closely held firms.3 LLCs now account for 
more business filings than corporations in twenty-nine states.4 
Statutory provisions in some states granting (or purporting to grant) mem-
bers of LLCs the option to contract out of their fiduciary duties, typically 
through a written operating agreement, are testing the outer limits off this free-
dom of contract. Fiduciary duties are perhaps best understood as a response to 
the impossibility of contracting for all contingencies due to limited information 
and high transaction costs.5 Courts have responded to this inability to create 
                                                        
1  See Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 158, 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws 537. 
2  Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360. 
3  LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 119 (2010). 
4  Sandra K. Miller, The Duty of Care in the LLC: Maintaining Accountability While Mini-
mizing Judicial Interference, 87 NEB. L. REV. 125, 132 n.22 (2008) (citing Howard M. 
Friedman, The Silent LLC Revolution—The Social Cost of Academic Neglect, 38 CREIGHTON 
L. REV. 35, 37–38 (2004)). 
5  See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & 
ECON. 425, 426–27 (1993). 
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express contractual provisions with implied provisions,6 but express provisions 
have governed since long before the rise of the highly flexible and contract-
based LLC.7 This contractarian view has been challenged on a number of 
grounds,8 including by a view that a fiduciary duty is a moral obligation9 and 
by arguments based on limits of cognition.10 This article is not intended to 
serve as a comprehensive rebuttal to criticism of the contractarian view. Rather, 
it quickly shows why the proper approach to the problem is economic and ad-
dresses the strongest economic arguments against allowing waiver. 
As one of the critics of the contractarian view has aptly put it, “the overall 
social policy goal of business entity governance [is] to foster investor confi-
dence while keeping transaction costs at a minimum.”11 It is not by accident 
that the social policy goal is expressed in starkly economic terms. The “fiduci-
ary” relationships discussed in this article are created by contracts of the usual 
sort, not as a function of a special relationship as in the traditional sense of a 
“fiduciary” relationship.12 The traditionalist-moralist school is off-base in push-
ing a traditional view of a fiduciary relationship—one based on a special rela-
tionship with specific duties—onto a different type of relationship lacking those 
hallmarks. Moreover, fiduciary duties make a poor vehicle for promoting social 
mores because remedies for a breach of fiduciary duty are available only within 
the LLC. If the concern is that LLCs are providing “important services affect-
ing the public health and welfare,”13 then fiduciary duties are a particularly 
poor avenue to protect the public health and welfare. 
Economic analysis of waiver of fiduciary duties—resting on decades of 
economic scholarship—has to start with a rebuttable presumption that private 
ordering—“self-regulation voluntarily undertaken by private parties”14—is suf-
ficient.15 The second step is to examine evidence that private ordering is imper-
                                                        
6  See id. at 427. 
7  See id. at 429 (giving several historical examples of waivers of certain fiduciary duties in 
diverse areas in which fiduciary duties have been applied). 
8  See Sandra K. Miller, What Fiduciary Duties Should Apply to the LLC Manager After 
More than a Decade of Experimentation?, 32 J. CORP. L. 565, 575 (2007) (listing schools of 
thought on fiduciary duties, in addition to the contractarian school, as the “traditional-
ist/moralistic school,” the “social science [or team production] school,” the “game theory 
school,” the “empirical school,” and the “structural school.”). 
9  See, e.g., Miller, supra note 4, at 136–37 (describing the duty of care as performing an im-
portant function to “express community values”). 
10  See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. 
L. REV. 211, 249–51 (1995). 
11  Miller, supra note 4, at 170–71. 
12  For example, a trustee-beneficiary, conservator-ward, lawyer-client, or executor-legatee 
relationship. 
13  Miller, supra note 4, at 128. 
14  Niva Elkin-Koren, What Contracts Cannot Do: The Limits of Private Ordering in Facili-
tating a Creative Commons, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 376 (2005). 
15  See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 212 (“Bargains normally create value, enable the 
parties to plan their future conduct reliably, allocate commodities to their highest-valued us-
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fect.16 The strongest evidence of such can be grouped into two categories: the 
absence of a public market17 and limits of cognition.18 For example, bounded 
rationality would prevent the parties from identifying all of the possible cir-
cumstances to which a waiver of fiduciary duties would apply; the availability 
heuristic would lead parties to give undue weight to their relationship at the 
time the LLC was formed because that relationship is vivid, concrete, and in-
stantiated; faulty telescopic faculties would tend to cause parties to give too 
much weight to the present benefits of their relationship as opposed to the fu-
ture costs a waiver of fiduciary duties could lead to; and faulty risk estimation 
will lead the parties to underestimate the possible future costs of a waiver.19 
Assuming without further inquiry that the above establishes that private or-
dering is imperfect—and it surely is—one cannot end the analysis there. To do 
so would be to fall prey to the Nirvana fallacy by comparing private ordering 
not to an actual alternative, but to an unattainable ideal.20 The next step, then, is 
to weigh the evidence of the costs of enforcing waivers against the costs of 
mandatory rules.21 The costs of mandatory fiduciary duties are considerable.22 
Litigation is a very costly avenue for recourse.23 Indeed, waiver may represent 
an understanding that recourse by litigation would be cost prohibitive. Manag-
ers make poor risk-bearers.24 Mandatory rules impose liability for acts that are 
                                                                                                                                
es, and best distribute the factors of production . . . .” (citing Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The 
Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 741, 743–47 (1982))). 
16  See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Re-
sponse to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1, 64 (1990) (“[T]he approach 
throughout the law of contract is to presume in favor of private ordering until some type of 
market failure can be shown.”). 
17  See, e.g., Miller, supra note 4, at 174 (“Factors that work either singly or in combination 
to create opportunities for abuse in the absence of a public market include: 1) domination by 
a controlling owner in the management of the firm or in developing its operating agreement; 
2) the separation of ownership and managerial control; 3) vulnerability resulting from the 
illiquid nature of the investment; and/or 4) decreased transparency and accountability result-
ing from reduced requirements concerning financial reporting and internal controls.”). 
18  See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 10. 
19  See id. at 220–25 (discussing limitations on cognition); id. at 249–51 (applying those 
limitations to the waiver question). 
20  See Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1, 
1 (1969); see also Butler & Ribstein, supra note 16, at 62. 
21  After all, delegation to an agent is always a question of a tradeoff between the “inevitable 
costs of delegating power to agents . . . [and] the benefits of doing so.” Butler & Ribstein, 
supra note 16, at 44. 
22  See id. at 53–59; see also Miller, supra note 4, at 177 (recognizing “mandatory fiduciary 
duties are generally criticized for increasing costs”). 
23  See Butler & Ribstein, supra note 16, at 29–30 (“[F]iduciary duties . . . expose the corpo-
ration to costly litigation.”); Miller, supra note 4, at 138 (recognizing it is not “practical to 
seek judicial intervention whenever a manager’s performance dips below the expected 
norm”); Miller, supra note 8, at 571 (recognizing the legal system “imposes astronomical 
legal fees and sky-rocketing legal judgments”). 
24  Butler & Ribstein, supra note 16, at 29–30, 53–54 (noting that managers are poor risk-
bearers in part because, unlike shareholders, they cannot “reduce the risk by diversification). 
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not intentionally harmful and for acts that do not benefit the members or man-
agers.25 The alternatives to allowing waiver do not give businesspeople the cer-
tainty they seek because almost all proposed alternatives allow some modifica-
tion of fiduciary duties and many treat judicial discretion in enforcement as a 
feature, not a bug.26 Restricting waiver of fiduciary duties intrudes on the sensi-
tive business decision of allocating managers time among myriad tasks.27 
Judges lack expertise,28 information,29 and motivation (money at stake) 
compared to the businesspeople who formed the LLC and agreed to the operat-
ing agreement. Moreover, judges (and the proponents of approaches that put 
discretion in judicial hands) are subject to cognitive limits of their own. An ac-
tor will only gather and process information until the marginal costs of doing so 
equal the marginal returns.30 With a major return for a judge being the ruling 
surviving appeal, judges have only limited incentives to heavily invest their 
most precious asset—their time—in understanding the underlying issues and 
the relationship of the parties at the time the agreement was made.31  
There is a robust body of research showing that “as a systematic matter, 
people are unrealistically optimistic.”32 Here it is not judges, but rather scholars 
who display undue optimism; recommendations for restrictions on waiver of 
fiduciary duties, particularly those that call for greater judicial scrutiny, under-
estimate the risk and cost of judicial error. The availability and representative-
ness heuristics lead decision-makers to judge the probability of an event “on the 
basis of comparable data and scenarios that are readily available to [the deci-
sion-maker’s] memory or imagination” and to “systematically and erroneously 
view unduly small samples as representative.”33 Contracts are performed 95 
percent or more of the time,34 but judges only see agreements that have failed 
in some way. Accordingly, it is likely that judges overestimate the likelihood 
that a waiver will be exploited by an opportunistic party. Further, it is danger-
ous to draw any conclusions about parties’ state of mind at the time the LLC 
                                                        
25  Id. at 53. 
26  See, e.g., id. at 62 (criticizing a recommendation for a four-factor judicial inquiry before 
enforcing opt-out); Miller, supra note 4, at 140 (criticizing an approach that “fails to permit 
the type of fine-tuning that may lead to more judicial scrutiny when there are passive inves-
tors and less judicial scrutiny when all partners participate”); Miller, supra note 8, at 600 
(recommending a mandatory “core” of duties that “are not exhaustive or exclusive”). 
27  See Butler & Ribstein, supra note 16, at 54. 
28  See id. at 56. 
29  See id. at 30 (“Because the parties usually cannot and do not specify the entire contract in 
their promise, the promise is only a ‘fragment’ of the entire understanding between the par-
ties.”). 
30  Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 214–15 (citing George J. Stigler, The Economics of Infor-
mation, 69 J. POL. SCI. 213 (1961)). 
31  See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi et al., What Do Federal District Judges Want? An Analysis of 
Publications, Citations, and Reversals, 28 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 518, 519 n.1 (2012). 
32  Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 216–18. 
33  Id. at 220–22. 
34  See id. at 227. 
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was formed or even about how often operating agreements with waivers of fi-
duciary duty go sour. Most business efforts using an LLC as a vehicle do not 
lead to disputes, most of those disputes do not lead to litigation, and most litiga-
tion ends with settlement, not a judicial opinion. 
Perhaps most importantly, the costs of a waiver of fiduciary duty, to the ex-
tent they exist, are borne entirely or almost entirely by the parties who freely 
entered into the agreement.35 Concerns about limits on cognition are similarly 
blunted by the fact that those limits apply to all parties to the agreement. 
Economic and broader normative debates aside, given that the controlling 
statute for each case discussed herein allows parties to in some way reduce, 
modify, or redefine their fiduciary duties, the analysis is properly first one of 
contractual and statutory interpretation. A reviewing court should begin its 
analysis by looking to the applicable statute for statutorily defined fiduciary du-
ties and limitations on the modification of those duties. The court should then 
determine if the action allegedly leading to breach of fiduciary duty falls within 
the fiduciary duties of the members as defined by the operating agreement. If 
the action does not violate a fiduciary duty established by the operating agree-
ment or fall outside of carve-outs from fiduciary duties in the operating agree-
ment (i.e., it is not a breach of contract), then the only remaining question for 
the court is whether the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing or an-
other contract doctrine was violated. 
A number of valid business reasons exist for parties to contract out of fidu-
ciary duties. A waiver of the duty of loyalty may be necessary to recruit a 
member already participating in a business that could be construed as compet-
ing. In an area of substantial uncertainty,36 parties can provide a more precise 
definition of their fiduciary duties. Tailored fiduciary duties can also be a very 
useful tool to socially conscious entrepreneurs. A waiver can help protect a 
member engaged in a number of intricate, intertwined business dealings. Tai-
lored fiduciary duties can be used to in effect cleanse planned related-party 
transactions ex ante. This article will argue that courts in states allowing the 
waiver of fiduciary duty should enforce those waivers so that LLC members 
may benefit from the above. 
                                                        
35  See Butler & Ribstein, supra note 16, at 49–50 (“[E]ven if new types of contract terms 
would impose new information and litigation costs, this does not make a case for mandatory 
limitation of contract terms because the costs of innovation are internalized. Unless the bene-
fits of innovative terms outweigh the costs, investors will simply refrain from investing in 
firms with new contract terms if information costs have impeded rapid discounting of infor-
mation into price or if there is an increased potential for costly litigation.” (footnote omit-
ted)). 
36  See Thomas M. Madden, Do Fiduciary Duties of Managers and Members of Limited Lia-
bility Companies Exist As with Majority Shareholders of Closely Held Corporations?, 12 
DUQ. BUS. L.J. 211, 214–15 (2010) (positing the law around fiduciary duties in “five major 
states”—Delaware, Massachusetts, California, New York, and Illinois—is much less clear 
for LLCs than for corporations). 
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LLC statutes offer far greater ability to contract out of fiduciary duties than 
partnership statutes that once would have covered the same types of business 
entities. Ribstein and Keatinge’s treatise on LLCs identifies five approaches to 
contracting out of fiduciary duties.37 Of these, the approach taken in the Dela-
ware statute is by far the most popular, rivaled only by the approach of the 
1996 Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (ULLCA).38 Twenty-five other 
states have adopted the Delaware approach. These include both major LLC 
states such as Nevada and Delaware,39 and major commercial states such as 
Texas and New York (and until recently, California).40 The Delaware approach 
allows for very broad freedom of contract in contracting out of fiduciary duties 
(outside of the implied duties of good faith and fair dealing inherent in all con-
tracts).41 
While it is unsurprising that many states would look to Delaware for busi-
ness association law given the leading role it has traditionally played, it is sur-
prising that those states would adopt such a permissive approach to this issue. 
Other states do not have the same unique incentives as Delaware to meet the 
changing needs of business associations.42 This article will argue that despite 
the categorization of these states with Delaware, by and large the enforceability 
of waivers of fiduciary duties remains very much in question in most of those 
states due to negative LLC case law, variations in the statutory text of individu-
al states, and negative limited partnership (LP) law. Courts in particular can be 
expected to cling tightly to the traditional conception of fiduciary duties rooted 
in equity, despite their questionable utility to modern, contractual business as-
sociations formed by sophisticated parties and statutory direction to the contra-
ry notwithstanding. Courts will also continue to show a tenuous understanding 
of the LLC as a distinct entity form.43 A recurring theme throughout this article 
is courts performing, at best, a limited statutory analysis in determining wheth-
                                                        
37  See 1 LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON LIMITED 
LIABILITY COMPANIES app. 9-6 (2015) (tabulated statutory provisions). 
38  See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 103(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1996). 
39  There were 47,726 LLC filings in Delaware in 2002, more than in any other state. There 
were 16,663 LLC filings in Nevada, more than some states with over twice its population. 
Friedman, supra note 4, at 92–93. 
40  California, Texas, and New York are the three largest states by gross domestic product as 
of 2008. Caitlin E. Coakley et al., U.S. Bureau of Econ. Analysis, Gross Domestic Product 
by State: Advance Statistics for 2008 and Revised Statistics for 2005–2007, 89 SURV. 
CURRENT BUS., June 2009, at 62, 89. 
41  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(e) (2016) (“[A] limited liability company [operat-
ing] agreement may not limit or eliminate liability for any act or omission that constitutes a 
bad faith violation of the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”). 
42  See, e.g., Lawrence A. Hamermesh, The Policy Foundations of Delaware Corporate Law, 
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1755–59 (2006); Roberta Romano, Law As a Product: Some 
Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225 (1985). 
43  A LexisNexis search for “limited liability corporation” performed on February 17, 2015, 
returned 5,987 cases. 
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er a waiver is enforceable. We also see a reluctance by the courts to treat so-
phisticated parties as such. 
Part I of this article provides a statutory overview of the five major ap-
proaches. Sub-approaches grouped with the “Delaware approach” are also dis-
cussed. Part II analyzes relevant LLC case law applying the law of states osten-
sibly adopting the Delaware approach. Given the paucity of LLC case law, Part 
III analyzes the statutory text of variations of the Delaware approach. Part IV 
attempts to make inferences where case law is insufficient through analysis of 
relevant LP case law. Part V surveys the macro (legislative and judicial) impli-
cations and Part VI will survey the micro (litigation and transaction planning) 
implications of the state of the case law and statutes. This article calls for courts 
to enforce operating agreements relieving members of fiduciary duties and for 
state legislatures to provide greater statutory clarity on the matter.44 
I. STATUTORY OVERVIEW 
Ribstein and Keatinge sort statutory provisions dealing with contracting 
out of fiduciary duties into five categories.45 The most popular approach, and 
the approach that is the primary focus of this article, gives very broad power to 
contract out of fiduciary duties in the operating agreement (the “Delaware ap-
proach”). Ribstein and Keatinge identify twenty-six states as having adopted 
this approach, including Delaware.46 The Idaho state legislature adopted the 
ULLCA effective July 1, 2017,47 and Idaho state law will not be discussed in 
this article. Although California repealed its LLC Act and adopted the ULLCA 
approach,48 California law will be addressed because the change was only ef-
fective as of January 1, 2014, and by its own terms the new act does not govern 
                                                        
44  This article will not address a number of outstanding issues tangentially related to waiver 
of fiduciary duties. Issues outside of the scope of this article include: exactly what default 
fiduciary duties apply in a given state; the fiduciary duties owed by non-managing members 
of an LLC as opposed to managers in a manager-managed LLC; the fiduciary duties owed to 
other members of an LLC as opposed to owed to the LLC itself; any fiduciary duties that 
may be owed by a controlling member to the non-controlling members; choice of law; and 
standing to sue another member of the LLC directly rather than through a derivative suit and 
other standing issues. This article will also not address fiduciary duties vis a vis third parties 
or what effect waiver of fiduciary duties may have on piercing the corporate veil. 
45  See 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 37. 
46  Id. (categorizing Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Geor-
gia, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mis-
sissippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, 
New York, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin under this approach). 
47  IDAHO CODE § 30-6-110 (2016) (repealed effective July 1, 2017). 
48  See CB Richard Ellis, Inc. v. Terra Nostra Consultants, 178 Cal. Rptr. 3d 640, 644 n.4 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (“The California Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act 
(§ 17701.01 et seq., added by Stats.2012, ch. 419, § 20) took effect on January 1, 2014, sup-
planting the Beverly-Killea Limited Liability Company Act (former § 17000 et seq., re-
pealed by Stats.2012, ch. 419, § 19).”). 
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contracts entered into before that date.49 New Jersey follows the ULLCA “man-
ifestly unreasonable” approach and will not be covered.50 Part III examines in 
greater depth variances between the LLC statutes of those twenty-four states.  
The second most popular approach, that of the ULLCA, states that mem-
bers may not eliminate the loyalty duty or good faith obligation or unreasona-
bly reduce duty of care, but may identify activities that do not violate the duty 
of loyalty if not manifestly unreasonable, and specify the vote necessary to ap-
prove the act or transaction that otherwise would violate the duty of loyalty.51 
There are also two minor approaches. Several jurisdictions limit the power to 
waive managers’ liability for a breach of the duty of care.52 A handful of juris-
dictions have neglected to provide any provision for the waiver of fiduciary du-
ties.53 
Given the potential for each jurisdiction to have a unique text, the ap-
proaches can bleed into each other, and, due to the variations in the statutory 
text under the Delaware approach, some of the states that are included in the 
Delaware approach group may more sensibly fit in another category. 
Twenty-four states ostensibly follow the Delaware approach,54 but the stat-
utory text of the applicable provision(s) varies among those states. The statuto-
ry approaches can be divided into five sub-approaches: (1) directly providing 
for the waiver;55 (2) indirectly providing for the waiver;56 (3) directly providing 
for the waiver but making no mention of elimination of fiduciary duties;57 (4) 
                                                        
49  CAL. CORP. CODE § 17713.04(b) (West Supp. 2016) (“[T]his title applies only to . . . con-
tracts entered into by the limited liability company or by the members or managers of the 
limited liability company, on or after January 1, 2014. The prior law governs all . . . con-
tracts entered into by the limited liability company or by the members or managers of the 
limited liability company, prior to January 1, 2014.”). 
50  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 42:2C-11 (West Supp. 2015). 
51  UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 103(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1996). 
52  See 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 37. 
53  Id. 
54  Those states are Alabama, Arkansas, California (repealed, but not retroactively), Colora-
do, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Mas-
sachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Nevada, New Hampshire, New 
Mexico, New York, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. 
55  See ALA. CODE § 10A-5A-1.08(b)(1) (Supp. 2015); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101 
(2016); NEV. REV. STAT. § 86.286(5) (2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:107 (2015). 
56  See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-402 (West 2004) (laying out fiduciary duties with the caveat 
“[u]nless otherwise provided in an operating agreement”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-19-16 
(West 2003) (setting duty of care to a “gross negligence or willful misconduct” standard “un-
less otherwise provided by . . . an operating agreement”). 
57  See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-76,134(c) (West 2014) (replacing the previous language that 
“[t]he member’s or manager’s or other person’s duties and liabilities may be expanded or 
restricted by provisions in an operating agreement” with language directly allowing elimina-
tion of fiduciary duties in the operating agreement, pursuant to 2014 Kan. Sess. Laws 224); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156C, § 63(b) (West 2005) (“To the extent that . . . a member or 
manager has duties, including fiduciary duties, and liabilities relating thereto . . . the mem-
ber’s or manager’s duties and liabilities may be expanded or restricted by provisions in the 
operating agreement.”); MO. ANN. STAT. § 347.088 (West 2015) (“The member’s, manager’s 
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directly providing for the waiver but with caveats;58 and (5) only providing that 
the operating agreement may eliminate or limit liability for monetary damages 
for breach of duty (exculpatory approach).59 
There is substantial variation from state to state. Some states carve out du-
ties that cannot be waived.60 Some states provide for fiduciary duties in their 
                                                                                                                                
or other person’s duties and liabilities may be expanded or restricted by provision in the op-
erating agreement.”); TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 101.401 (West 2012) (“The [operating] 
agreement of a limited liability company may expand or restrict any duties, including fiduci-
ary duties, and related liabilities that a member, manager, officer, or other person has to the 
company or to a member or manager of the company.”); CAL. CORP. CODE app. § 17005(d) 
(West 2014) (repealed 2014). 
58  See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-108(1.5) (West 2006) (“To the extent that a member 
or manager or other person that is a party to, or is otherwise bound by, the operating agree-
ment has duties, including, but not limited to, fiduciary duties, to a limited liability company 
or to another member, manager, or other person that is a party to or is otherwise bound by an 
operating agreement, the duties of such member, manager, or other person may be restricted 
or eliminated by provisions in the operating agreement, as long as any such provision is not 
manifestly unreasonable.” (emphasis added)); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-305(4)(A) (West 
2003) (“To the extent that . . . a member or manager has duties (including fiduciary duties) 
and liabilities relating thereto to a limited liability company or to another member or manag-
er: (A) The member’s or manager’s duties and liabilities may be expanded, restricted, or 
eliminated by provisions in . . . a written operating agreement; provided, however, that no 
such provision shall eliminate or limit the liability of a member or manager: (i) For inten-
tional misconduct or a knowing violation of law; or (ii) For any transaction for which the 
person received a personal benefit in violation or breach of any provision of a written operat-
ing agreement . . . .”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-29-123(4) (2016); WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 25.15.038(6) (2016). 
59  See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 34-143(1) (West 2015) (“An operating agreement may . . . 
[e]liminate or limit the personal liability of a member or manager for monetary damages for 
breach of any [fiduciary] duty provided for in section 34-141 . . . .”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 275.180(1) (West 2006) (“A written operating agreement may . . . [e]liminate or limit the 
personal liability of a member or manager for monetary damages for breach of any [fiduci-
ary] duty provided for in [section] 275.170 . . . .”); LA. STAT. ANN. § 12:1315 (2010); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.4407 (West 2011); N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW § 417(a) (McKinney 
2016); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 57C-3-32(a)–(b) (West 2011) (repealed 2014) (“Subject to 
subsection (b) of this section, . . . a written operating agreement may: (1) Eliminate or limit 
the personal liability of a manager, director, or executive for monetary damages for breach of 
any [fiduciary] duty provided for in [section] 57C-3-22 . . . . No provision permitted under 
subsection (a) of this section shall limit, eliminate, or indemnify against the liability of a 
manager, director, or executive for (i) acts or omissions that the manager, director, or execu-
tive knew at the time of the acts or omissions were clearly in conflict with the interests of the 
limited liability company, (ii) any transaction from which the manager, director, or executive 
derived an improper personal benefit . . . .”) North Carolina’s chapter 57C was repealed in 
2014 and replaced with a rather more confusing wording that appears to indirectly allow 
waiver in chapter 57D. 
60  See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-305(4) (2003) (“[N]o such provision shall eliminate or 
limit the liability of a member or manager: (i) For intentional misconduct or a knowing vio-
lation of law; or (ii) For any transaction for which the person received a personal benefit in 
violation or breach of any provision of a written operating agreement . . . .”); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 57C-3-32(b)(ii) (West 2011) (repealed 2014) (“No provision permitted under 
subsection (a) of this section shall limit, eliminate, or indemnify against the liability of a 
manager, director, or executive for . . . (ii) any transaction from which the manager, director, 
or executive derived an improper personal benefit.”). 
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LLC statutes61 and some import fiduciary duties from partnership law.62 There 
remains some question of exactly what fiduciary duties apply in some states.63 
II. CASE LAW ANALYSIS OF THE DELAWARE APPROACH 
Case law in states following the Delaware approach is marked by a contrast 
between a trove of precedent in Delaware and a paucity of precedent in the rest 
of the states. Part A analyzes decisions by the Delaware courts. Part B analyzes 
decisions by courts in other states tracking the decisions of the Delaware 
courts. Part C analyzes decisions by courts in other states that fail to follow the 
approach of the Delaware decisions. Part D discusses states with no case law 
available, and Part E provides a final analysis. 
A. Delaware Courts 
Delaware courts have addressed the enforceability of a waiver of fiduciary 
duties in the LLC context more often than courts in any other state. The Dela-
ware Court of Chancery has certainly addressed the issue far more often than 
any other individual court. In general, Delaware state courts have been very 
open to enforcing waivers of the fiduciary duties of LLC members.64 The Del-
                                                        
61  See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 57C-3-22 (West 2011) (repealed 2014). 
62  See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE app. § 17153 (West 2014) (repealed 2014). 
63  See Madden, supra note 36, at 213 (identifying the roots of uncertainty in LLC fiduciary 
duties in ambiguous corporation law decisions). 
64  See, e.g., Wood v. Baum, 953 A.2d 136, 140–42 (Del. 2008) (holding a waiver of liability 
for any action not fraudulent, illegal, or in bad faith required the plaintiff to plead such a 
claim with particularized facts); Dawson v. Pittco Capital Partners, L.P., No. 3148-VCN, 
2012 WL 1564805, at *26–28 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2012) (relying on Fisk Ventures, L.L.C. v. 
Segal in holding that LLC agreement waived all fiduciary duties); Related Westpac L.L.C. v. 
JER Snowmass L.L.C., No. 5001-VCS, 2010 WL 2929708, at *8 (Del. Ch. July 23, 2010) 
(refusing to examine reasonableness of decisions because operating agreement removed any 
reasonableness qualification on the member’s power to make those decisions); Fisk Ven-
tures, L.L.C. v. Segal, No. 3017-CC, 2008 WL 1961156, at *9–10 (Del. Ch. May 7, 2008) 
(enforcing operating agreement with a provision disclaiming any fiduciary duties not set 
forth expressly within the operating agreement and providing for duties in no other provi-
sion); Flight Options Int’l, Inc. v. Flight Options, L.L.C., No. 1459-N, 2005 WL 6799224, at 
*7 (Del. Ch. July 11, 2005) (interpreting provision requiring transactions between the LLC 
and its majority owner meet an “arms’ length” standard to trump a provision setting broad 
fiduciary duties). But see Paige Capital Mgmt., L.L.C. v. Lerner Master Fund, L.L.C., No. 
5502-CS, 2011 WL 3505355, at *31–32 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 2011) (holding “sole discretion” 
clause not a broad waiver of fiduciary duty); In re Atlas Energy Res., L.L.C., No. 4589-
VCN, 2010 WL 4273122, at *8 (Del. Ch. Oct. 28, 2010) (holding provision inapplicable 
where it referenced only conflicts of interest with affiliates, not the minority unitholders at 
issue); Vila v. BVWebTies L.L.C., No. 4308-VCS, 2010 WL 3866098, at *12 (Del. Ch. Oct. 
1, 2010) (holding that traditional corporation law principles did not trump an explicit provi-
sion of the operating agreement); Kelly v. Blum, No. 4516-VCP, 2010 WL 629850, at *10–
12 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24, 2010) (enforcing an exculpatory provision but holding that it did not 
serve as a waiver of fiduciary duties); Bay Ctr. Apartments Owner, L.L.C. v. Emery Bay 
PKI, L.L.C., No. 3658-VCS, 2009 WL 1124451, *at 8–9 (Del. Ch. Apr. 20, 2009) (interpret-
ing contract as providing no waiver); Solar Cells, Inc. v. True N. Partners, L.L.C., No. 
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aware federal courts and courts in other states have also enforced waivers under 
Delaware law.65 This openness to contracting around default rules is not limited 
to fiduciary duties—Delaware courts have enforced other types of waivers 
found in LLC operating agreements.66 
The Delaware Supreme Court addressed the enforceability of a waiver of 
fiduciary duty for LLC members in Wood v. Baum.67 MME was an investment 
house organized as a Delaware LLC.68 Paddy Wood, the plaintiff, sued the de-
fendants, the directors of MME’s board, for a number of separate breaches of 
fiduciary duty.69 The LLC’s operating agreement contained a provision excul-
pating the directors from liability “except in cases of fraudulent or illegal con-
duct.”70 Thus, the plaintiff was required to plead a non-exculpated claim, in this 
case including “particularized facts that demonstrate that the directors acted 
with scienter” due to the nature of the carve-outs contained in the waiver.71 The 
plaintiff had failed to do so, and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed dismis-
sal of her complaint.72 
The case best indicative of how open the Delaware courts are to waivers of 
fiduciary duty is Fisk Ventures, L.L.C. v. Segal.73 Dr. Segal formed an LLC, 
                                                                                                                                
Civ.A. 19477, 2002 WL 749163, at *4 (Del. Ch. Apr. 25, 2002) (finding a waiver of liability 
from any conflict of interest did not prevent injunctive relief). 
65  See, e.g., In re ALH Holdings L.L.C., 675 F. Supp. 2d 462, 478 (D. Del. 2009) (enforcing 
provision of operating agreement limiting the standard for breaches of fiduciary duty to in-
stances of fraud, criminal action, bad faith, and gross negligence); In re CLK Energy Part-
ners, L.L.C., No. 09-05042, 2010 WL 1930065, at *8–9 (Bankr. W.D. La. May 12, 2010) 
(rejecting claim for breach of fiduciary duty by the trustee on the basis that it did not refer-
ence the operating agreement and thus did not give fair notice); Westbard Apartments, 
L.L.C. v. Westwood Joint Venture, L.L.C., 954 A.2d 470, 479–82 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
2007) (reversing lower court decision finding sections of the operating agreement together 
constituting a waiver as ambiguous). But see In re Reg’l Diagnostics, L.L.C., 372 B.R. 3, 29 
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007) (interpreting a waiver limiting breach of fiduciary duties to in-
stances of bad faith as not affecting the duty of loyalty). 
66  See, e.g., Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 288–89, 292 (Del. 1999) 
(holding the Court of Chancery lacked jurisdiction due to a clause requiring all disputes to be 
arbitrated in California); R & R Capital, L.L.C. v. Buck & Doe Run Valley Farms, L.L.C., 
No. 3803-CC, 2008 WL 3846318, at *4–7 (Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2008) (enforcing a waiver of 
the right to force dissolution); Douzinas v. Am. Bureau of Shipping, Inc., 888 A.2d 1146, 
1148–49 (Del. Ch. 2006) (relying on Elf Atochem in enforcing an arbitration provision man-
dating arbitration of a claim addressing the validity of a waiver of fiduciary duty); see also 
Dillon v. Typaldos, 2006 WL 1381625, *11–12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2006) (enforcing 
mandatory arbitration provision under Delaware law). 
67  See Wood, 953 A.2d 136. 
68  Id. at 138. 
69  See id. at 139. 
70  Id. 
71  Id. at 141. 
72  Id. at 141, 144. 
73  See Fisk Ventures, L.L.C. v. Segal, No. 3017-CC, 2008 WL 1961156 (Del. Ch. May 7, 
2008). 
PACE - 16 NEV. L.J. 1085 - FINAL 6/20/2016  5:58 PM 
Summer 2016] FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN LLCS 1097 
Gentrix,74 with Dr. Johnson to develop and market biomedical technology.75 
Dr. Segal contributed patents acquired during his postdoctoral fellowship, 
while Dr. Johnson served as the deep pocket.76 Dr. Johnson and Fisk Ventures, 
an entity he controlled, eventually came to control three of five seats on the 
Gentrix board, but due to a requirement in the operating agreement that 75 per-
cent of directors approve most actions, Dr. Segal was able to maintain an effec-
tive veto.77 Initial financing proved insufficient, and faced with Dr. Johnson’s 
unwillingness to contribute further capital, Dr. Segal asked that the “Put 
Rights” of the class B investors be suspended in order to make the company 
more attractive to outside investors.78 Dr. Johnson, who owned or controlled 
most of the class B interest, refused.79 Dr. Segal was unable to secure new in-
vestors, and Dr. Johnson and the other class B interest holders exercised a pro-
vision of the operating agreement allowing them to remove him as CEO.80 
With the two sides unable to agree on a future course and the company out of 
operating cash, Fisk Ventures (controlled by Dr. Johnson) brought suit to force 
dissolution of Gentrix.81 
Dr. Segal made counterclaims against Fisk Ventures for breach of contract 
and fiduciary duties.82 There was one small problem with Dr. Segal’s claim—
Fisk Ventures owed no fiduciary duties to Gentrix under the operating agree-
ment. The operating agreement expressly waived any fiduciary duties not ex-
pressly set forth elsewhere in the operating agreement.83 No other provision in 
the operating agreement created a fiduciary duty of any sort.84 The court found 
this sufficient to reject Dr. Segal’s counterclaim, although it did hedge by stat-
ing that even if the operating agreement did establish fiduciary duties, Dr. Segal 
did not allege facts sufficient to allow an inference of “gross negligence, willful 
misconduct, . . . bad faith, or . . . knowing[] violat[ion of] the law.”85 In its 
analysis of the breach of fiduciary duty claim, the court merely reiterated its 
earlier analysis of the breach of contract claim. There were no fiduciary duties 
to be violated. 
                                                        
74  Gentrix was initially formed as a Maryland LLC but was later moved to Delaware. Id. at 
*2. 
75  Id. 
76  Id. 
77  Id. 
78  Id. at *3–4. 
79  Id. at *4. 
80  Id. at *4–5. 
81  Id. at *6. 
82  Id. 
83  Id. at *9 (“No Member shall have any duty to any Member of the Company except as ex-
pressly set forth herein or in other written agreements.”). 
84  Id. at *11 (“Pursuant to this provision, the Genitrix LLC Agreement eliminates fiduciary 
duties to the maximum extent permitted by law by flatly stating that members have no duties 
other than those expressly articulated in the Agreement. Because the Agreement does not 
expressly articulate fiduciary obligations, they are eliminated.”). 
85  Id. at *10. 
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Delaware courts have made a strong statement for the freedom of contract 
and the enforceability of waivers of fiduciary duties. While there may still be 
some questions around the edges, there is sufficient case law to be confident in 
the enforceability of a variety of waivers. 
B. Case Law Tracking the Approach of Delaware Courts 
Courts in six states—Georgia, Kansas, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Ne-
vada, and Texas—have case law tracking the Delaware courts. 
1. Georgia Case Law 
The Georgia Court of Appeals addressed the issue of waiver of fiduciary 
duties in three cases, all decided in 2005 (three judges served on both the en 
banc panel for one of the cases and the three-judge panel for another).86 In the 
first case, Stoker v. Bellemeade, L.L.C., the Stokers and other investors formed 
several Georgia LLCs to develop real estate.87 The Stokers brought suit claim-
ing that the other members breached their fiduciary duties by, among other 
things, usurping an LLC opportunity by developing other tracts of land.88 Rely-
ing on the Georgia LLC Act,89 the court noted that members may restrict their 
fiduciary duties by contract in the operating agreement.90 The court interpreted 
the waiver provision in the operating agreement as giving the members free 
rein to participate in competing businesses.91 Thus, developing tracts of land 
not covered by the operating agreement did not breach any fiduciary duties.92 
                                                        
86  See Alimenta (USA), Inc. v. Oil Seed S., L.L.C., 622 S.E.2d 363, 365 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2005); Stoker v. Bellemeade, L.L.C., 615 S.E.2d 1, 4 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005), rev’d in part on 
other grounds, 631 S.E.2d 693 (Ga. 2006). 
87  Stoker, 615 S.E.2d at 4. 
88  Id. at 8–9. 
89  See GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-305 (West 2003). 
90  Stoker, 615 S.E.2d at 9. 
91  Id. at 9–10 (“The LLC operating agreements at issue . . . contained the following provi-
sions: ‘[N]othing in this Agreement shall be deemed to restrict in any way the rights of any 
Member, or of any Affiliate of any Member, to conduct any other business or activity what-
soever, and no Member shall be accountable to the [LLC] or to any other Member with re-
spect to that business or activity even if the business or activity competes with the [LLC’s] 
business. The organization of the [LLC] shall be without prejudice to the Members’ respec-
tive rights (or the rights of their respective Affiliates) to maintain, expand, or diversify such 
other interests and activities and to receive and enjoy profits or compensation therefrom. 
Each Member waives any rights the Member might otherwise have to share or participate in 
such other interests or activities of any other Member or Member’s Affiliates.’ These provi-
sions make clear that, despite any duties described in the LLC Act that might have otherwise 
restrained a member from competing with the LLC, the members exercised the freedom 
granted by the LLC Act to restrict or eliminate those duties by contract and to engage in ac-
tivities which competed with the LLC’s business.” ). 
92  Id. at 10. 
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Two judges on the Stoker panel dissented in part and concurred in part.93 
The dissent took issue with the majority’s interpretation of the “other business 
or activity” language from the waiver provision in the operating agreement.94 
The dissent argued that because the operating agreement did not indicate which 
parcels of land it applied to, and because many of the parcels were not added to 
the individual LLCs until years after the operating agreement was signed, it 
was not clear whether the parcels in question should be included in the “busi-
ness” of the LLC for the purpose of the waiver provision.95 Thus, there was an 
ambiguous question of fact that should have been put before the jury.96 Note 
that the dissent’s critique was of the interpretation of the scope of a contract 
term, not of the enforceability of the waiver provision. 
The decision in Alimenta (USA), Inc. v. Oil Seed South, L.L.C., soothed any 
concerns there might have been that the dissent in Stoker was a sign of hostility 
toward waivers of fiduciary duties.97 One of the judges from the Stoker dissent 
authored the opinion in Alimenta.98 Alimenta and Oil Seed formed a joint ven-
ture organized as a Georgia LLC to build a cottonseed oil plant.99 Alimenta 
gained control of the LLC when the price of cottonseed oil unexpectedly 
dropped by converting loans to capital contributions.100 Subsequently, it sold 
the LLC to a company in which it held a partial ownership stake.101 Alimenta 
then sued Oil Seed under the operating agreement for indemnification for 50 
percent of its capital contributions.102 
Oil Seed alleged in its counterclaim that Alimenta had breached its fiduci-
ary duties by engaging in a self-dealing transaction without disclosing it to Oil 
Seed.103 The court, however, held that any contract terms more specific than the 
provisions of the LLC Act would prevail.104 The court then properly interpreted 
provisions granting Alimenta complete management control and allowing Ali-
menta to engage in conflict of interest transactions or compete with the LLC as 
waiving Alimenta’s duty of loyalty to the LLC.105 Thus, the self-dealing trans-
                                                        
93  See id. at 13 (Barnes, J., and Adams, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). 
94  Id. at 19. 
95  Id. 
96  Id. at 18, 20. 
97  See Alimenta (USA), Inc. v. Oil Seed S., L.L.C., 622 S.E.2d 363, 365 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2005). 
98  Id. (Judge Barnes). 
99  Id. 
100  Id. 
101  Id. 
102  Id. 
103  Id. (relying on GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-305(1) (West 2003)). 
104  Id. at 367 (citing Tower Projects v. Marquis Tower, 598 S.E.2d 883 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2004)). 
105  Id. (“The contract provided that any member could engage in conflict of interest transac-
tions, and that as manager, Alimenta was allowed to compete directly with Mid Georgia and 
had ‘complete control of the management of the Company’s business and affairs.’ ”). 
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action did not breach a fiduciary duty because the applicable duty had been 
waived. 
The Georgia Court of Appeals enforced another limited waiver of the duty 
of loyalty in Ledford v. Smith.106 In Ledford, a carpet company (owned in part 
by eventual plaintiff Ledford) and a group of investors (including eventual de-
fendant Smith) organized a Georgia LLC to sell carpet to the hospitality indus-
try.107 In order to maintain control over who their business partners would be, 
the parties included provisions in the operating agreement giving the other par-
ties a right of first refusal for the interest of a member desiring to sell.108 The 
operating agreement also contained a partial waiver of the duty of loyalty al-
lowing members to participate in any business not directly competing with the 
LLC (with an exception carved out for Ledford’s carpet company).109 The 
Smith cohort of investors, desiring to gain control of the LLC in order to sell it, 
exercised the mandatory put and call provision in the operating agreement and 
offered Ledford’s company $3.5 million (financed by an outside buyer) for its 
share of the LLC.110 Ledford’s company chose to sell.111 
Ledford sued Smith, et al., alleging that they breached their fiduciary duty 
of loyalty by failing to disclose that their offer was funded by a third party.112 
The court held that the Smith cohort had no duty to disclose their negotiations 
with the third party because the negotiations were for financing.113 Entrance of 
a third party into the ownership group was not implicated so the right of first 
refusal provision was not triggered (by the time an actual offer was made the 
Smith group had full control of the LLC).114 The court also held that the nego-
tiations with a third party did not violate the provision disallowing direct com-
petition because it could not be construed as “competing” with the LLC.115 
                                                        
106  See Ledford v. Smith, 618 S.E.2d 627, 627 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005). 
107  Id. at 630. 
108  Id. 
109  Id. at 631 (“Paragraph 7.3 provided: ‘Activities of Member and Affiliates. Notwithstand-
ing the provisions of OCGA § 14-11-307 of the [Georgia Limited Liability Company] Act, 
the Members acknowledge and agree that the Members and their respective Affiliates are 
presently, or may become in the future, general partners of partnerships, managers of other 
limited liability companies, or associated in some other manner with other businesses. The 
Members and their respective Affiliates may engage in all such other business ventures, in-
cluding without limitation ventures involving the purchase, sale and operation of other busi-
nesses, but no Active Member shall engage in businesses similar to the business of the Com-
pany by competing with the business of the Company while they are employed with the 
Company, except for business associations of Active Members with Vista Carpet Industries, 
LLC.’ ”). 
110  Id. at 632. 
111  Id. 
112  Id. at 633. 
113  Id. 
114  Id. at 634. 
115  Id. at 635. 
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Stoker, Alimenta, and Ledford together provide strong support for the en-
forceability of waivers of the duty of loyalty under the Georgia LLC Act. While 
no Georgia case has addressed the enforceability of a waiver of the duty of 
care, it is likely that a court interpreting the Georgia LLC Act will enforce 
waivers to their statutory limit.116 
2. Kansas Case Law 
Kansas courts have only addressed the enforceability of a fiduciary waiver 
provision in an LLC operating agreement in one case, Lynch Multimedia Corp. 
v. Carson Communications, L.L.C.117 Lynch, the plaintiff company, had formed 
a joint venture with a trust and a company, both controlled by Carson, an indi-
vidual, for the purpose of operating cable television franchises.118 This joint 
venture was organized as a Kansas LLC, with the trust and the company as 
members and Carson as the president.119 Carson learned that several cable sys-
tems were for sale.120 These opportunities were presented at meetings of the 
members, and they approved further consideration of acquisitions.121 An origi-
nal deal for a package of three of the cable systems fell through, after which 
Carson came to terms with one of the cable systems through Carson Communi-
cations, another company he controlled.122 Carson then passed this opportunity 
along to the LLC with additional terms including an increase in his salary and 
the calculated value of his equity.123 When the LLC failed to move on the new 
proposal, Carson later closed on the acquisitions through Carson Communica-
tions.124 
Lynch sued Carson and Carson Communications, alleging that Carson 
breached his fiduciary duties to the LLC by: (a) not presenting the final oppor-
tunity to the LLC without additional added terms, and (b) taking the opportuni-
ty without approval during a formal meeting of the LLC members.125 The oper-
ating agreement contained a provision requiring the members to first offer the 
opportunity to buy cable systems in a delineated geographic area to the LLC 
and a provision allowing members to engage in competing businesses.126 The 
                                                        
116  See GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-305(A)(4) (West 2003) (“[N]o such provision shall elimi-
nate or limit the liability of a member or manager: (i) For intentional misconduct or a know-
ing violation of law . . . .”). 
117  See Lynch Multimedia Corp. v. Carson Communications, L.L.C., 102 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 
1265 (D. Kan. 2000). 
118  Id. at 1262. 
119  Id. 
120  Id. at 1263. 
121  Id. 
122  Id. 
123  Id. 
124  Id. 
125  Id. at 1264. 
126  Id. at 1262–63 (“The two provisions of the Operating Agreement which are central to 
this case are set forth below: ‘Other Cable Systems. Any opportunity which comes to the at-
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court interpreted the two provisions in light of each other, properly holding that 
they allowed members of the LLC to purchase a cable system in the specified 
geographic region so long as they first offered the opportunity to the LLC.127 
Finding no requirement that the opportunity be offered at a formal meeting and 
noting the passage of time between the original notice of the opportunity and 
Carson purchasing the cable system, the court held that he had not breached the 
operating agreement.128 The court equated the contract question with the ques-
tion of fiduciary duties owed, finding that Carson had not breached any fiduci-
ary duties because he had complied with the requirements of the operating 
agreement and making no challenge to the reduction of fiduciary duties by the 
operating agreement.129 
Lynch provides strong support for the enforceability of waivers under Kan-
sas law.130More recently, the court in the District of Kansas held that the Kan-
sas overriding fairness standard did not trump a provision in the operating 
agreement reducing fiduciary duties.131 However, no Kansas state court has yet 
enforced a waiver or reduction of fiduciary duties. As decisions by federal 
courts, Lynch and Rajala will not be binding on Kansas state courts, carrying a 
danger that a Kansas state court may be reticent in applying the plain meaning 
of the Kansas statute. 
3. Louisiana Case Law 
The first courts to address the enforceability of waiver under Louisiana law 
were federal, not state, courts. In In re Provenza, the bankruptcy court stated 
the applicable LLC articles eliminated the alleged damages through a limitation 
of liability for breaches of fiduciary duty.132 But because the court had already 
determined that no breach of fiduciary duty had occurred, its statement was dic-
ta.133 In Sigma Delta, L.L.C. v. George, the district court rejected a motion to 
                                                                                                                                
tention of a Member to purchase cable television systems . . . shall first be offered to the 
Company. . . . Other Interests. Any Member or Manager may engage independently or with 
others in other business ventures of every nature and description. Neither the Company nor 
any Member shall have any right by virtue of this Agreement of the relationship created 
hereby in or to any other ventures or activities in which any Member or Manager is involved 
or to the income or proceeds derived therefrom. The pursuit of other ventures and activities 
by Members or Managers is hereby consented to by the Members and shall not be deemed 
wrongful or improper.’ ”). 
127  Id. at 1264. 
128  Id. at 1264–65. 
129  Id. at 1265 (“Under Kansas law, the members of a limited liability company may expand 
or restrict their duties and liabilities by the terms of their agreement.” (citing KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 17-76, 134(c))). 
130  See also Rajala v. Gardner, No. 09-2482-EFM, 2012 WL 1189773, at *17 (D. Kan. Apr. 
9, 2012) (holding that Kansas overriding fairness standard did not trump a provision in the 
operating agreement reducing fiduciary duties). 
131  Id. 
132  In re Provenza, 316 B.R. 225, 232 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2003). 
133  Id. 
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dismiss, ruling that the indemnification provision in question covered the plain-
tiffs.134 The court did not explicitly address its enforceability and did not indi-
cate if the issue had been raised by Sigma Delta. 
It would not be until 2014 that a Louisiana court would speak clearly on 
the issue. In Broussard v. Tipton, disputes over a failed venture to produce, 
market, and sell seasoning products led to a claim by Mr. Broussard and an af-
filiated LLC against Mr. Tipton and two affiliated LLCs for breach of their fi-
duciary duty of trust and loyalty.135 The defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment included an argument that they could not be held liable based on an 
explicit indemnification provision in the articles of incorporation.136 The court 
upheld the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, finding no need to reach 
the issue of whether the underlying conduct constituted a breach of any fiduci-
ary duty because “the provision for indemnity in the articles of organization 
clearly eliminates any liability [the defendants] would have.”137 
But the Broussard court, however definitive its language, issued an un-
published decision. And just three days earlier, the Louisiana Court of Appeal 
for the Second Circuit in a published decision interpreted a limitation of the du-
ty of loyalty very narrowly.138 Accordingly, the law in Louisiana should be re-
garded as unsettled. 
4. Massachusetts Case Law 
The highest court of Massachusetts recently addressed the enforceability of 
a waiver of fiduciary duties in Pointer v. Castellani.139 Pointer, the president 
and a member of Fletcher Granite Company, LLC, brought various claims 
against other members of the LLC after a freeze-out.140 The defendants coun-
terclaimed for breach of fiduciary duty, arguing that Pointer had been offered 
an opportunity to participate in the development of several tracts of land and 
had failed to present the opportunity to the LLC.141 The court found that lan-
guage in the operating agreement “explicitly allowing any member the right ‘to 
conduct any other business or activity whatsoever’ ” absolved Pointer of any 
duty to pass along a business opportunity “not involved within [the LLC’s] line 
                                                        
134  Sigma Delta, L.L.C. v. George, No. 07-5427, 2008 WL 1744798, at *1 (E.D. La. Apr. 
11, 2008). 
135  Broussard v. Tipton, No. 2013 CA 1268, 2014 WL 3559371, at *1–2 (La. Ct. App. Apr. 
24, 2014). 
136  Id. at *4. 
137  Id. (footnote omitted). 
138  Monroe Surgical Hosp., L.L.C. v. St. Francis Med. Ctr., Inc., 147 So.3d 1234, 1248–49 
(La. Ct. App. 2014). 
139  Pointer v. Castellani, 918 N.E.2d 805, 819–21 (Mass. 2009). 
140  Id. at 808. 
141  Id. at 819. 
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of business.”142 The court made clear that the operating agreement, not the tra-
ditional doctrine of business opportunity, governed.143 
Pointer disrupted a long series of cases, led by Wartski v. Bedford,144 refus-
ing to enforce waivers of fiduciary duty in LP and partnership agreements. 
Wartski is long settled law in Massachusetts, and courts may be loath to aban-
don it, more recent precedent to the contrary notwithstanding. Pointer is also 
the only case enforcing a waiver; however, it is a case decided by the highest 
court in Massachusetts and will be binding on all lower Massachusetts state 
courts. A lower court judge wishing to avoid enforcing a waiver of fiduciary 
duty in the LLC context will be forced to distinguish Pointer. 
5. Missouri Case Law 
Missouri courts only recently addressed the enforceability of a waiver in 
Hibbs v. Berger.145 After ruling that managers of an LLC have fiduciary duties 
to the members of the LLC under Missouri law, the court noted that LLCs, un-
like partnerships or corporations, were permitted to “effectively limit or define 
the scope of the fiduciary duties imposed upon an LLC’s members and manag-
er.”146 Looking then to the LLC’s operating agreement, the court found provi-
sions stating that “[a] member who makes a loan to the [LLC] shall have no fi-
duciary duty . . . to not declare a default . . . or to not initiate any collection or 
enforcement actions or proceedings by it as lender,” and that members would 
not be liable for acts made “in good faith and in a manner reasonably believed 
. . . to be within the scope of authority granted . . . and in the best interests of 
the [LLC].”147 Thus, the court correctly held that the manager could not be lia-
ble for foreclosing on the LLC’s assets and that he could not be liable for any 
other alleged acts because the plaintiff had not proffered anything demonstrat-
ing he acted in bad faith.148 It is only one case, but it is a strong statement in fa-
vor of allowing at least partial waiver that is made more effective by the force 
and clarity of its reasoning. 
6. North Carolina Case Law 
North Carolina courts have not always been fully appreciative of the 
strongly contractual nature of LLCs,149 but nonetheless the case law has devel-
                                                        
142  Id. 
143  Id. at 820. 
144  Wartski v. Bedford, 926 F.2d 11 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that a waiver of the duty of loy-
alty was ineffective in defeating the business opportunity doctrine). 
145  Hibbs v. Berger, 430 S.W.3d 296 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014). 
146  Id. at 316. 
147  Id. 
148  Id. at 316–17. 
149  See Crouse v. Mineo, 658 S.E.2d 33, 36 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) (“A limited liability com-
pany (LLC) is a ‘statutory form of business organization . . . that combines characteristics of 
business corporations and partnerships.’ ” (quoting Hamby v. Profile Prods., L.L.C., 652 
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oped in a manner favorable toward waivers by LLC members of their fiduciary 
duties. The question of enforceability of a waiver of the fiduciary duties of an 
LLC member was first raised in North Carolina in RSN Properties, Inc. v. 
Jones.150 A corporation, RSN Properties, and an individual, Jones, were the 
sole members of an LLC organized to buy and sell real estate.151 The operating 
agreement allowed the members of the LLC to participate in other business ac-
tivities, even if those activities were in competition with the LLC.152 Through 
another company, Jones sold two mobile homes purchased at a steep discount 
to the LLC for the full invoice price.153 
RSN Properties sued Jones for breach of fiduciary duty for, among other 
things, converting to himself the profit on the sale of the mobile homes to the 
LLC.154 Although the court noted that the statute allowed an operating agree-
ment to alter the duty of the manager to account, the court did not reach the is-
sue of whether the operating agreement in fact did so.155 While the court as-
sumed an interpretation that the operating agreement only allowed participation 
in competing business would be valid, it left the decision for remand.156 The 
parties apparently settled, and the question of fiduciary waivers in the LLC 
context in North Carolina remained unresolved by the courts. 
The ultimate disposition of RSN Properties left a bankruptcy court with no 
precedent to apply in In re Allentown Ambassadors, Inc.157 The debtor in Allen-
town was a minor league baseball team (the Allentown Ambassadors) that 
played in an independent league organized as a North Carolina LLC.158 The 
Ambassadors fell on difficult financial times and filed for chapter 11 bankrupt-
cy in 2004.159 The Ambassadors filed a claim in bankruptcy court against the 
commissioner of the league (a managing member of the LLC and the owner of 
one of the teams) for breach of fiduciary duty, alleging disparate treatment.160 
The commissioner had refused to help the Ambassadors find a buyer for the 
                                                                                                                                
S.E.2d 231, 235 (N.C. 2007) (quoting RUSSELL M ROBINSON, II, ROBINSON ON NORTH 
CAROLINA CORPORATE LAW § 34.01, at 34-2 (rev. 7th ed. 2006)))). But see id. (“The [LLC] 
Act contains numerous ‘default’ provisions or rules that will govern an LLC only in the ab-
sence of an explicitly different arrangement in the LLC’s articles of organization or written 
operating agreement. Because these default provisions can be changed in virtually any way 
the parties wish, an LLC is primarily a creature of contract.” (quoting ROBINSON, supra, at 
34-2 to 34-3)). 
150  RSN Properties, Inc. v. Jones, No. COA04-100, 2005 WL 465551, at *2 (N.C. Ct. App. 
Mar. 1, 2005). 
151  Id. at *1. 
152  Id. 
153  Id. at *1–2. 
154  Id. 
155  Id. at *4. 
156  Id. 
157  In re Allentown Ambassadors, Inc., 361 B.R. 422 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2007). 
158  Id. at 426. 
159  Id. at 430. 
160  Id. at 460. 
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team and had refused to allow them to “go dark” (i.e., not play for a season and 
only pay annual dues to the league), despite making similar concessions for 
other teams during roughly the same time period.161 While the bankruptcy court 
noted that there was no precedent on-point and that the North Carolina LLC 
Act did not set fiduciary duties, the court nonetheless predicted that a North 
Carolina state court would hold that the commissioner owed a fiduciary duty to 
individual members of the LLC.162 The bankruptcy court was wrong to analo-
gize to North Carolina corporate law163 rather than focusing on the operating 
agreement and the text of the North Carolina LLC Act. In doing so, the bank-
ruptcy court rejected the argument by the commissioner that the operating 
agreement served to waive or indemnify his fiduciary duties to the members of 
the LLC.164 The bankruptcy court was likely influenced by what appeared to be 
unfair treatment by the commissioner, but, because the operating agreement 
placed no such restrictions on the commissioner, the LLC members had implic-
itly placed this decision-making at the discretion of the commissioner. The 
court should not have applied heightened standards based on the exercise of 
that discretion in treating individual situations differently. 
The issue was next raised to a federal district court in Morris v. Hennon & 
Brown Properties, L.L.C.165 H&B Properties, a member of three LLCs orga-
nized to fund and manage separate construction projects, alleged that Morris, as 
co-manager of each of the LLCs, had breached his fiduciary duties.166 The 
court noted that, while the operating agreement of an LLC may eliminate the 
personal liability of a manager for breach of most fiduciary duties,167 the oper-
ating agreements in question contained no such waiver.168 Because it found no 
waiver and ultimately found H&B Properties did not have standing to bring a 
direct action against Morris for breach of fiduciary duties, the court refused to 
extend its analysis further and clarify the murky state of North Carolina LLC 
law at the time.169 As a federal court interpreting state law, the district court 
                                                        
161  Id. at 429–30. 
162  Id. at 461 (citing Farndale Co. v. Gibellini, 628 S.E.2d 15, 19 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006); 
Freese v. Smith, 428 S.E.2d 841, 848 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993); Loy v. Lorm Corp., 278 S.E.2d 
897, 901 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981)). 
163  Id. 
164  Id. at 460–61 (“Section 3.5 of the Operating Agreement provides: ‘No Member of the 
Company shall be liable to the Company for monetary damages for an act or omission in 
such Member’s capacity as a Manager, except as provided in the Act for (I) acts or omis-
sions which a Member knew at the time of the acts or omissions were clearly in conflict with 
the interests of the Company; (ii) any transaction from which a Member derived an imper-
sonal benefit.’ ”). 
165  Morris v. Hennon & Brown Props., L.L.C., No. 1:07CV780, 2008 WL 2704292 
(M.D.N.C. July 3, 2008). 
166  Id. at *1. 
167  See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 57C-3-31 (West 2011) (repealed 2014). 
168  Morris, 2008 WL 2704292, at *2. 
169  Id. at *4–6. The court did, however, cite to the leading treatise on business association 
law in North Carolina: “The duties of good faith, due care, and loyalty may not be eliminated 
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was correct in refusing to provide guidance even in dicta.170 Thankfully, the en-
forceability of a waiver of fiduciary duty under North Carolina law was only to 
remain unresolved for another year. 
Authoritative, albeit incomplete, guidance was finally given by a North 
Carolina state appellate court in Kaplan v. O.K. Technologies, L.L.C.171 The 
plaintiff, Kaplan, and an existing company, AEI, organized O.K. Technologies, 
L.L.C., to develop, manufacture, and sell aquarium components, assigning all 
of AEI’s intellectual property to the LLC.172 Kaplan owned the largest stake in 
the LLC, but the operating agreement specified that management decisions re-
quired the approval of a “Majority in Interest.”173 Kaplan made extensive loans 
to the LLC.174 Less than three years after organizing the LLC, the members 
voted to dissolve it.175 
When the LLC failed to repay Kaplan’s loans within a couple of months, 
he filed suit.176 O.K. Technologies’ counterclaim for breach of fiduciary duty 
was at issue in the appeal.177 The court implicitly rejected O.K. Technologies’ 
characterization of the closely held LLC as a partnership.178 Relying on the 
North Carolina LLC Act,179 the court upheld a provision in the operating 
agreement limiting liability of a member of the LLC to any other member to 
three explicit exceptions (none of which were implicated by the facts of the 
case).180 
Interestingly, despite the plain reading of both the applicable provision of 
the statute and the applicable provision of the operating agreement as providing 
for exculpation from liability, the court in Kaplan characterized the waiver as 
limiting the duties of the managers of the LLC.181 A true waiver of fiduciary 
                                                                                                                                
or restricted by agreement of the members [of the LLC] . . . .” Id. (quoting ROBINSON, supra 
note 149, § 34.04[3], at 34-23 to 34-24.1). 
170  This highlights one of the inherent roadblocks to the development of LLC case law. Be-
cause many LLCs are formed by sophisticated parties and involve large sums of money (par-
ticularly those that involve waivers of fiduciary duty), the parties frequently take advantage 
of choice of law principles to agree contractually to settle disputes in federal district court. 
They are also more likely to have complete diversity. Those courts can provide neither prec-
edent binding to the state courts nor will they provide guidance via dicta. 
171  Kaplan v. O.K. Techs., L.L.C., 675 S.E.2d 133 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009). 
172  Id. at 135. 
173  Id. 
174  Id. 
175  Id. at 136. 
176  Id. 
177  Id. 
178  Id. at 140 (“[Defendants] also argue that Kaplan owed them a fiduciary duty based on the 
sole fact that O.K. was a closely-held LLC. [Defendants] argue that the relationship between 
members of a closely-held LLC is like the fiduciary relationship between partners in a part-
nership. [Defendants], however, ignore the fact that by their operating agreement, the parties 
expressly limited the duties the member-managers owed.” (citations omitted)). 
179  See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 57C-3-32(a) (West 2011) (repealed 2014). 
180  Kaplan, 675 S.E.2d at 140. 
181  Id. 
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duty might be better supported by the general contractual nature of the LLC 
and the lack of language in the North Carolina LLC Act expressly disallowing 
waiver, rather than an exculpation provision expressly mentioning only mone-
tary damages.182 However confused the statutory interpretation is, Kaplan pro-
vides a strong precedent for the enforcement of a waiver of fiduciary duty un-
der North Carolina law. 
7. Nevada Case Law 
The waiver question has not been addressed under Nevada law since the 
Nevada legislature liberalized its LLC Act to directly allow even the elimina-
tion of fiduciary duties by contract in the operating agreement.183 The Nevada 
federal district court, however, has dealt with the issue between the passage and 
effective date of the amendments to the Nevada LLC Act. The defendants in 
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. KB Home, several real estate companies, had 
organized a Nevada LLC in order to develop a large tract of land in Henderson, 
Nevada.184 JPMorgan led the syndicate financing of the initial purchase.185 The 
original plan called for the members of the LLC to purchase parcels of the full 
tract from the LLC; however, the members subsequently refused to do so, forc-
ing construction to stop and the LLC to default on its loan agreement with 
JPMorgan.186 
JPMorgan sued the members and their parent companies for, among other 
things, breaches of fiduciary duties.187 JPMorgan responded to the waiver pro-
vision in the operating agreement by asserting that it was invalid under Nevada 
law.188 Analogizing LLCs to partnerships, JPMorgan relied on the Nevada 
Partnership Act189 to argue that waivers of fiduciary duty should be restricted 
for LLC members in a manner similar to that for partners.190 The court noted 
that the Nevada LLC Act contained no such restriction and that the Nevada Su-
preme Court had not addressed “whether such a restriction nonetheless should 
be implied.”191 Again, a federal district court was faced with the uncomfortable 
task of predicting how a state court would address the enforceability of a waiv-
                                                        
182  See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 57C-3-32(a) (West 2011) (repealed 2014) (“Subject to sub-
section (b) of this section, . . . a written operating agreement may: (1) Eliminate or limit the 
personal liability of a manager, director, or executive for monetary damages for breach of 
any [fiduciary] duty provided for in [section] 57C-3-22 . . . .”). Chapter 57C was repealed in 
2014, but its replacement, chapter 57D, is hardly a model of clarity, only indirectly allowing 
for waiver. 
183  NEV. REV. STAT. § 86.286(7) (2013) (relevant section added in 2009). 
184  JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. KB Home, 632 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1018 (D. Nev. 2009). 
185  Id. 
186  Id. at 1018–19. 
187  Id. at 1019. 
188  Id. at 1024. 
189  NEV. REV. STAT. § 87.4316(2) (2013). 
190  KB Home, 632 F. Supp. 2d at 1024. 
191  Id. 
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er of fiduciary duties without any clear statutory or case law guidance. The 
court properly assumed that, had the Nevada Legislature intended for the same 
restrictions imposed on partnerships to apply to LLCs, the Nevada Legislature 
would have included provisions in the LLC Act similar to those in the partner-
ship act.192 The court also interpreted the recently passed changes to the Neva-
da LLC Act directly allowing elimination of fiduciary duties as reiterating that 
intent,193 in what was perhaps a backdoor application of a law that had not yet 
taken effect. 
Given that no case addressing the enforceability of a waiver under Nevada 
law has been decided since the Nevada LLC Act was liberalized to imitate the 
Delaware LLC Act, JP Morgan can be considered the leading case on the ques-
tion. However, it is a federal district court case and will not be binding on Ne-
vada state courts. The only other case addressing the question of a waiver of 
fiduciary duties under the Nevada LLC Act—Kira, Inc. v. All Star Mainte-
nance194—was decided by a federal district court in Texas and was decided pri-
or to the changes to the Nevada LLC Act. 
8. Texas Case Law 
Texas courts have addressed—albeit tangentially—the enforceability of a 
waiver of fiduciary duties in a single case. The court in Allen v. Devon Energy 
Holdings, L.L.C., noted that the Texas Business Organizations Code left the 
LLC’s members “free to expand or eliminate, as between themselves, any and 
all potential liability of [the LLC’s manager], as they saw fit,” but ultimately 
held that that the manager’s actions violated his fiduciary duty as defined in the 
operating agreement.195 Thus, no court in Texas has actually enforced a waiver 
of fiduciary duty by LLC members. 
C. Case Law Departing from the Approach of Delaware Courts 
Not every state’s courts have been as open to waiver of fiduciary duties by 
LLC members as have those in Delaware. However, only two of the states 
classed with Delaware have been truly hostile—New York and California. 
                                                        
192  Id. at 1025. 
193  Id. at 1025–26. 
194  Kira, Inc. v. All Star Maint., No. A-03-CA-950 LY, 2006 WL 2193006, at *15 (W.D. 
Tex. July 31, 2006) (interpreting a waiver of the duty of loyalty very narrowly and thus find-
ing a breach of fiduciary duty). 
195  Allen v. Devon Energy Holdings, L.L.C., 367 S.W.3d 355, 396 (Tex. App. 2012). The 
judgment was ultimately set aside and remanded by agreement of the parties, but the court 
refused to withdraw its original opinion. See Allen v. Devon Energy Holdings, L.L.C., No. 
01-09-00643-CV, 2013 WL 273026, at *1 (Tex. App. 2013). 
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1. New York Case Law 
In 2002, a New York court addressed a release of all claims in the LLC 
context in TIC Holdings, L.L.C. v. HR Software Acquisition Group, Inc.196 The 
court interpreted the release narrowly, reasoning that if it construed it according 
to its own terms, it “would be insupportably broad.”197 That construction was 
not founded on a mere reluctance to give the parties the benefit of the bargain, 
but a recognition that such a “construction would render much of the language 
contained in the . . . release mere surplusage.”198 The court did further state, 
however, that a full release would be ineffective because a release cannot under 
New York law “insulate a releasee from wilful or intentional misconduct.”199 
The Appellate Division did not reach the issue, holding that it was “unclear 
whether [the defendants’] conduct falls within either of the provisions relied 
upon.”200 The Supreme Court of New York, New York County, again very nar-
rowly construed a provision limiting liability, this time an exculpatory clause, 
in Arfa v. Zamir.201 
It would not be until 2012 that New York’s highest court would address the 
issue in Pappas v. Tzolis.202 Plaintiffs Pappas and Ifantopoulos and defendant 
Tzolis formed a LLC to lease a building in lower Manhattan long-term, with 
Pappas and Ifantopoulos contributing $50,000 and $25,000, respectively.203 
The original LLC agreement provided that the three members of the LLC could 
“engage in business ventures and investments of any nature whatsoever, 
whether or not in competition with the LLC.”204 After numerous business dis-
putes, and one year after the LLC was formed, Tzolis bought out Pappas’s and 
Ifantopoulos’s membership interests in the LLC for $1,000,000 and 
$500,000.205 The Agreement of Assignment and Assumption included a provi-
sion that “Tzolis has no fiduciary duty to the undersigned Sellers in connection 
with [the] assignments.”206 Seven months later Tzolis assigned the lease to a 
third-party for $17,500,000.207 Pappas and Ifantopoulos sued, alleging that 
Tzolis had already been in surreptitious negotiations to assign the lease when 
                                                        
196  TIC Holdings, L.L.C. v. HR Software Acquisition Grp., Inc., 750 N.Y.S.2d 425 (Sup. Ct. 
2002). 
197  Id. at 112. 
198  Id. at 112–13. 
199  Id. at 113. 
200  TIC Holdings, L.L.C. v. HR Software Acquisitions Grp., Inc., 755 N.Y.S.2d 19, 20 
(App. Div. 2003). 
201  See Arfa v. Zamir, 873 N.Y.S.2d 231 (Sup. Ct. 2008) (interpreting a clause expressly 
limiting liability for acts in good faith as not modifying the duty of loyalty). 
202  982 N.E.2d 576 (N.Y. 2012). 
203  Id. at 578. 
204  Id. 
205  Id. 
206  Id. (alternation in original). 
207  Id. 
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he bought them out, and he breached his fiduciary duties to them by failing to 
disclose the negotiations.208 
The court ultimately upheld the release from claims based on fiduciary du-
ty, but in doing so it did not rely on, look to, or interpret the relevant New York 
statute. Instead, the court relied on a case interpreting the duties and law appli-
cable to the majority shareholder in a closely held corporation.209 The New 
York statute provides that the operating agreement may eliminate or limit dam-
ages for breach of a duty, except for acts or omissions that are in bad faith, in-
volve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law, or that result in a 
financial profit or other advantage that the member was not entitled to.210 In-
stead, the court relied on a broader principle of New York law that waivers of 
fiduciary duty are enforceable where the releasing party is sophisticated and 
“the fiduciary relationship is no longer one of unquestioning trust.”211 The court 
held that Pappas and Ifantopoulos were sophisticated parties and that the rela-
tionship of trust had been destroyed by the disputes among the members.212 The 
court reached the correct result—enforcing the release; but reached it on the 
wrong basis—failing to apply the plain language of the statute.213 
2. California Case Law 
A California court first addressed the enforceability of a waiver of fiduci-
ary duties between LLC members in USAT Reorganization L.L.C. v. Writer.214 
Krintzman, an attorney, and Writer, one of his clients, formed a two-member 
LLC for the sole purpose of purchasing a corporation (stock in the corporation 
was to be the LLC’s only asset).215 After disputes arose between the two, they 
negotiated an operating agreement that set the members’ rights and obliga-
tions.216 By agreement,217 the two agreed to release the other from any claims 
                                                        
208  Id. 
209  Id. at 579 (relying on Centro Empresarial Cempresa S.A. v. America Movil, S.A.B. de 
C.V., 952 N.E.2d 995 (N.Y. 2011)). 
210  N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW § 417(a) (McKinney 2016). 
211  Pappas, 982 N.E.2d at 579 (quoting Centro Empresarial, 952 N.E.2d at 1001). 
212  Id. 
213  See also Sybron Can. Holdings, Inc. v. Niznick, No. 650908/14, 2015 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 
352, at *35–36 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 3, 2015) (ruling the contract was ambiguous); DeBene-
dictis v. Malta, No. 602537/2008, 2014 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5862, at *5–9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
Mar. 6, 2014) (ruling that fiduciary duties cannot be modified or eliminated absent explicit 
language to that effect); Kafa Invs., L.L.C. v. 2170-2178 Broadway, L.L.C., 958 N.Y.S.2d 
577, 580–84 (Sup. Ct. 2013) (enforcing a broad release where the plaintiffs were sophisticat-
ed parties). 
214  USAT Reorganization L.L.C. v. Writer, No. D043230, 2004 WL 2538848 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Nov. 10, 2004). 
215  Id. at *1–2. 
216  Id. at *2. 
217  It is not entirely clear from the court’s opinion whether this was a part of the operating 
agreement or a separate agreement signed on the same day. However, the court does not dis-
tinguish on this basis and there is no reason to believe that it being part of the operating 
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related to the management of the LLC for actions on or before the date of the 
agreement.218 That agreement gave Writer majority control of the LLC and 
made him its sole manager.219 Writer promptly began using his position to shift 
control of the corporation from the LLC to himself and his confederates.220 
Krintzman, individually and derivatively through the LLC, filed suit 
against Writer, et al., alleging, among other things, breach of a number of fidu-
ciary duties.221 Despite the language of the release signed earlier by both par-
ties,222 the court interpreted the agreement to have no effect on Writer’s fiduci-
ary duties to the LLC.223 The court noted that the California LLC Act set the 
fiduciary duties of an LLC manager to the LLC as those of a partner to the 
partnership224 and applied in the LLC context case law holding that fiduciary 
duties related to fundamental partnership business.225 
The court in Writer was surely influenced by Writer blatantly taking ad-
vantage of the terms of the settlement agreement. However, that was a path that 
Krintzman chose to leave open in negotiating the settlement, and it is difficult 
to say that Krintzman was not a sophisticated investor relative to his client, 
Writer. The court failed to engage in a full analysis of the California LLC Act, 
instead relying on partnership cases that are likely irrelevant given the text of 
the California LLC Act.226 A court interpreting California law is unlikely to di-
ve into said statutory analysis now that Writer has provided a negative prece-
dent, especially with the LLC Act ostensibly allowing for waiver having been 
repealed. 
D. No Case Law Available 
In the remaining fourteen states,227 no court has directly considered wheth-
er a waiver of fiduciary duty is enforceable. This leaves tremendous uncertainty 
                                                                                                                                
agreement, if it was in fact not, would have made any difference in the disposition of the 
case. So, for the purposes of this article, it will be assumed that the provision was part of the 
operating agreement. See id. 
218  Id. at *16. 
219  Id. at *2. 
220  Id. at *2–3. 
221  Id. at *3–4, *9. 
222  Id. at *16 (quoting the agreement in releasing claims “arising out of or in connection 
with, or relating in any way to” the management of the LLC “up to and including the date of 
this agreement” as well as any related fiduciary relationship between Krintzman and Writer 
or the LLC). 
223  Id. at *16–17. 
224  See CAL. CORP. CODE app. § 17153 (West 2014) (repealed 2014). 
225  Writer, 2004 WL 2538848, at *19 (“The fiduciary obligations of a general partner with 
respect to matters fundamentally related to the partnership business cannot be waived or con-
tracted away in the partnership agreement.” (quoting Everest Investors 8 v. McNeil Partners, 
8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 31, 40 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003))). 
226  See infra Part III.C (interpreting the California LLC Act). 
227  Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Washington, and Wisconsin. It 
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for parties considering forming an LLC and desiring to modify or waive fiduci-
ary duties. A planning attorney must look to the statutory text and to LP case 
law to divine predicted treatment of a waiver of fiduciary duties for LLC mem-
bers. 
Courts in each state will likely be amenable to operating agreement provi-
sions expanding fiduciary duties, because the focus of the law had traditionally 
been on protecting the party in a vulnerable position in a fiduciary relationship. 
Likewise, albeit to a lesser extent, courts will be more open to redefinition or 
modification of fiduciary duties in a way that does not reduce the overall duties 
of the members. Courts can also be expected to be more likely to enforce high-
ly detailed provisions as opposed to very broad, all-encompassing provisions, 
which can more easily be interpreted in a narrow fashion to avoid waiving the 
alleged breach before the court. 
E. Final Analysis 
With an unparalleled body of precedent, waivers can be approached with 
the most certainty for Delaware LLCs. Georgia and North Carolina both offer 
multiple favorable decisions. Only one precedent exists in Kansas, but it is a 
positive one uncontroverted by statutory ambiguity or negative LP case law. 
Massachusetts law also contains a single positive precedent and clear statutory 
support for waiver, but dangerous negative LP case law exists. The only posi-
tive precedent in Louisiana is an unpublished opinion. After revisions to the 
Nevada LLC Act, planning attorneys can be confident that waivers will be en-
forced under Nevada law. Case law in Texas should be considered unsettled 
with only a single case in support, and that language is arguably dicta. A court 
in California, on the other hand, has provided clear precedent that a waiver of 
fiduciary duties will not be enforced, even for LLCs formed before the Califor-
nia LLC Act was repealed and replaced with one following the ULLCA ap-
proach. New York courts have also made clear they will enforce requirements 
outside of the statute before enforcing a waiver. Planning attorneys in states 
without LLC precedent, on the other hand, must make inferences about the en-
forceability of waivers based on statutory text and LP case law. Taken together, 
the above shows that the enforceability of a waiver of fiduciary duties in the 
LLC context is far from a given, even in the states with the most permissive 
language in their respective LLC statutes. 
                                                                                                                                
should be noted, however, that courts in Connecticut will take an equitable approach and 
look to the operating agreement in defining fiduciary duties for LLC members. See Binder v. 
Windmill Mgmt., L.L.C., No. FSTX08CV106004435S, 2013 WL 593936, at *11 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Jan. 17, 2013) (relying on control provisions of the operating agreement in hold-
ing that no member was in a position to dominate the relationship and thus there were no 
fiduciary duties). 
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III. ANALYSIS OF THE STATUTORY TEXT 
Very little case law deals directly with the enforceability of waivers of fi-
duciary duties. In a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy, this may be due to planning 
attorneys advising their clients against including such waivers due to the uncer-
tainty created by a lack of case law. Absent binding authority to rely on, it be-
comes necessary to look to the statutory text to better understand the expected 
approach in states lacking adequate authority. This section examines the statu-
tory text in states adopting each of the five sub-approaches under the umbrella 
Delaware approach. Part A examines the statutory text in states taking the di-
rect approach. Part B analyzes the text for states that provide for waiver only 
indirectly. Part C and Part D examine the text for states that modify a direct ap-
proach by failing to provide directly for elimination or by adding caveats, re-
spectively. Part E examines the text of states only providing for exculpation. 
Part F provides a final analysis showing that despite being categorized as a 
Delaware approach, the proper interpretation varies quite a bit from sub-
approach to sub-approach. 
A. Direct Approach 
Delaware, Nevada, Alabama, and New Hampshire make the clearest and 
strongest statements allowing full waiver of all fiduciary duties.228 There re-
mains no restriction on waivers in either state beyond the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing implicit in all contracts.229 All four states also expressly 
provide for a policy giving “maximum effect to the principle of freedom of 
contract and to the enforceability” of the operating agreement.230 Delaware ad-
ditionally provides that the common law rule governing statutory provisions 
conflicting with the common law is not applicable to the section providing for 
waivers of fiduciary duties.231 While a case has yet to enforce complete elimi-
                                                        
228  See supra note 55 and accompanying text; see also 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 
37. 
229  ALA. CODE § 10A-5A-1.08(b)(1) (Supp. 2015) (“To the extent that, at law or in equity, a 
member or other person has duties, including fiduciary duties, to the limited liability compa-
ny, or to another member or to another person that is a party to or is otherwise bound by a 
limited liability company agreement, the member’s or other person’s duties may be expand-
ed or restricted or eliminated by a written limited liability company agreement, but the im-
plied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing may not be eliminated.”); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(e) (2016) (“[A] limited liability company [operating] agreement 
may not limit or eliminate liability for any act or omission that constitutes a bad faith viola-
tion of the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”); NEV. REV. STAT. 
§ 86.286(7) (2013) (tracking the Delaware act’s provision almost word-for-word); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 304-C:107 (2015) (using the exact language of the Alabama provision). 
230  ALA. CODE § 10A-5A-1.06(a) (Supp. 2015); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b) (2016); 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 86.286(4)(b) (2013) (containing more forceful language than the Dela-
ware provision and stating that the operating agreement “must be interpreted and construed” 
in such a manner); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:2 (2015). 
231  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(a) (2016) (“The rule that statutes in derogation of 
the common law are to be strictly construed shall have no application to this chapter.”). This 
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nation of fiduciary duties, the Delaware, Nevada, Alabama, and New Hamp-
shire statutes provide for it in the strongest and clearest language possible.232 
B. Indirect Approach 
Arkansas LLC case law is very sparse, and no court has addressed a waiver 
of fiduciary duties.233 The Arkansas LLC statute only indirectly allows waiver 
of fiduciary duties. The Arkansas LLC Act sets the duty of care to a “gross neg-
ligence or willful misconduct” level “[u]nless otherwise provided in an operat-
ing agreement.”234 The duty of loyalty is not addressed at all. This stands in 
stark contrast with the Arkansas LP Act, which explicitly sets fiduciary du-
ties,235 and puts express constraints on contractual restrictions on those du-
ties.236 The failure of the Arkansas legislature to provide the same level of 
guidance concerning fiduciary duties for LLCs as for LPs suggests that the leg-
islature intended for members of LLCs to have the ability to more freely con-
tract away fiduciary duties. Courts may still be tempted to simply co-opt LP 
case law rather than take a critical look at the statutory text, but the enforceabil-
ity of a waiver for partners in an LP has not been addressed by an Arkansas 
court (unsurprising, given how clearly the Arkansas LP Act limits waiver). 
No case has directly addressed whether fiduciary duties may be waived by 
LLC members under New Mexico or Wisconsin law. The applicable provisions 
of both the New Mexico LLC Act and the Wisconsin LLC Act are highly simi-
lar to the corresponding provisions in the Arkansas statutes. They both use the 
same “[u]nless otherwise provided [by or in] . . . an operating agreement” lan-
guage used by the Arkansas LLC Act.237 The New Mexico LLC Act also gives 
no guidance regarding business opportunity doctrine or competing with the 
LLC. The best interpretation of the New Mexico statute is the same as for the 
Arkansas statute—the legislature intended for members of LLCs to have the 
                                                                                                                                
should prevent a court in Delaware or Nevada from treating analysis of a waiver as a matter 
of common law fiduciary duties, but rather as a matter of contract law (albeit one that may 
lead to traditional fiduciary duty analysis where the parties leverage the common law terms 
of art in their contract). See Myron T. Steele, Judicial Scrutiny of Fiduciary Duties in Dela-
ware Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 14 
(2007) (applying these principles to lay out a framework for an analysis under Delaware 
law). 
232  But see Steele, supra note 231, at 22 (“Delaware courts remain reluctant to leave the se-
cure ground of fiduciary duty common law so well fleshed out in corporate governance deci-
sions even in the face of a statute instructing them to do so.”). 
233  See Michael A. Thompson, An Uncertain Duty: K.C. Properties, Inc. v. Lowell Invest-
ment Partners, LLC and the Duty of Loyalty in an Arkansas Limited Liability Company, 62 
ARK. L. REV. 563, 574–75 (2009) (discussing briefly the three cases addressing the substan-
tive rights of LLC members). 
234  ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-402 (West 2004). 
235  See id. § 4-47-408. 
236  See id. § 4-47-110(b)(5) (stating that the duty of loyalty may not be eliminated); id. § 4-
47-110(b)(6) (stating that the duty of care may not be reduced unreasonably). 
237  N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-19-16 (West 2003); WIS. STAT. § 183.0402 (West 2014). 
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ability to freely contract away fiduciary duties. Interpretation of the Wisconsin 
LLC Act is a little more complicated. Its provision on the duties of managers 
and members also provides that “[a]n operating agreement may impose duties 
on its members and managers that are in addition to those provided [above].”238 
That provision should be interpreted as merely providing clarity that an operat-
ing agreement may modify duties up as well as down, but it is an example of 
exceedingly poor drafting and its interpretation by a court cannot be predicted 
with confidence. 
The Maryland LLC Act takes a different track, providing that “the policy 
of this title is to give the maximum effect to the principles of freedom of con-
tract and to the enforceability of operating agreements”239—language used by 
other states amenable to waiver, including Delaware—but without any more 
explicit language. The Maine LLC Act turns the direct approach on its head, 
stating that “[a] limited liability company agreement may not . . . [e]liminate or 
limit a member’s liability to the limited liability company and members for 
monetary damages for a bad faith violation of the implied contractual covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing.”240 
C. Direct Approach with No Mention of Elimination 
Five states directly provide for waiver of fiduciary duties but omit any 
mention that fiduciary duties may be “eliminated.”241 At first blush it may seem 
that because the word “eliminate” is not used, legislatures intended to allow 
parties to reduce fiduciary duties to some level not rising to a complete waiver. 
The language of the statutes stands in contrast to that of the Delaware, Nevada, 
Alabama, and New Hampshire statutes, which do use the word eliminate. 
However, the omission of “eliminate” alone does not prevent, or even lead 
inexorably to, a construction of the statute allowing complete waiver. That is, 
there is nothing in the text overtly preventing elimination. Perhaps more im-
portantly, any reliance on the presence of the word “eliminate” in the text of the 
Delaware statute would be misplaced. The Delaware statute, on which these 
statutes were likely modeled, did not contain the word “eliminate” until the leg-
islature added it in 2004. The Delaware legislature was acting in response to 
dicta in the Delaware Supreme Court decision for Gotham Partners, L.P. v. 
Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P.,242 expressing the opinion of the court that the 
current language did not allow for the elimination of fiduciary duties.243 It ap-
pears that the intent of the legislature all along was to allow fiduciary duties to 
                                                        
238  WIS. STAT. § 183.0402(3). 
239  MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 4A-102 (LexisNexis 2016). 
240  ME. STAT. tit. 31, § 1522(1)(F) (2011). 
241  See supra note 57 (California, Kansas, Massachusetts, Missouri, and Texas). 
242  Gotham Partners, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P., 817 A.2d 160, 167–68 (Del. 
2002). 
243  See Steele, supra note 231, at 10–14, 17 (discussing the evolution of the Delaware LP 
Act). 
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be completely eliminated; it only became necessary to clarify their intent due to 
confusion created by the Delaware Supreme Court. Kansas courts, in particular, 
are likely to favor an interpretation that squares with Delaware law.244 
Statutory waiver provisions often must be interpreted in conjunction with 
multiple provisions, which may be difficult to reconcile. California’s former 
provision is particularly troublesome. An analysis starts out innocuously 
enough, with section 17005 directly stating that “[t]he fiduciary duties of a 
manager to the limited liability company and to the members of the limited lia-
bility company may only be modified in a written operating agreement with the 
informed consent of the members.”245 Unfortunately, other provisions of the 
California Corporate Code complicate matters. Section 17153 provides that 
“[t]he fiduciary duties a manager owes to the limited liability company and to 
its members are those of a partner to a partnership and to the partners of the 
partnership.”246 Turning to the partnership section of the Code, we find that the 
duties of loyalty and care are defined in section 16404.247 Section 16103 pro-
vides that a partnership agreement may not eliminate the duty of loyalty or un-
reasonably reduce the duty of care, but allows carve-outs from the duty of loy-
alty for “specific types or categories of activities.”248 
These four provisions do not leave the proper application of California law 
entirely clear. The most reasonable interpretation is that only section 16404 and 
not section 16103 should be incorporated into LLC doctrine by section 17153, 
thus making section 17005 the controlling provision regarding waivers. The 
language of section 17153 only sets the fiduciary duties of LLC managers to 
that of partners in a partnership; it does not speak to waiver or modification of 
those duties.249 The only provision in the California LLC Act that does is sec-
tion 17005, thus it should govern.250  
California courts have been quick to rely on partnership case law in stating 
that partners cannot contract out of their fiduciary duties,251 but an interpreta-
tion of the four applicable provisions that is not manifestly unreasonable can 
                                                        
244  See Edwin W. Hecker, Jr., Fiduciary Duties in Business Entities, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 975, 
975 (2006) (observing that courts in Kansas have noticed the legislature’s acceptance of 
Delaware’s leadership in applying Delaware case law as persuasive authority). The Kansas 
LLC Act has now been amended to directly provide for elimination. See KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 17-76, 134(c) (West 2014). 
245  CAL. CORP. CODE app. § 17005(d) (West 2014) (repealed 2014). 
246  Id. app. § 17153 (repealed 2014). 
247  Id. § 16404. 
248  Id. § 16103(b)(3)–(4). 
249  See id. app. § 17153 (repealed 2014). 
250  See id. app. § 17005(d) (repealed 2014). 
251  See, e.g., Woodson v. Legacy Partners 2323 L.P., No. A100627, 2003 WL 22795886, at 
*4 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2003) (holding that refinancing the debt of the development 
owned by the LP was fundamentally related to the partnership business and thus could not be 
covered by a waiver of fiduciary duties); BT-I v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of the U.S., 
89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 811, 816 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding that fiduciary duties fundamental to the 
relationship between the parties cannot be waived). 
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support the same. If section 17153 is interpreted as incorporating both sections 
16404 and 16103 into LLC doctrine, then section 17005 must be reconciled 
with section 16103. Section 17005 states that fiduciary duties “may only be 
modified in a written operating agreement.”252 The most reasonable interpreta-
tion of this language in light of the exact delineations around permissible modi-
fications in section 16103 is that it merely adds an additional requirement that a 
modification of fiduciary duty must be included in the operating agreement. 
The court in USAT did not perform this analysis. Instead, it noted that the LLC 
Act set fiduciary duties for members to those of a partner and jumped directly 
to an analysis of partnership case law.253 Now that there is precedent on which 
a court can rely, it is doubtful that said court would perform a full statutory 
analysis, particularly when that analysis may not support the existing precedent 
and when the relevant statutory provisions have been repealed. 
D. Direct Approach with Caveats 
The Georgia, Washington, Colorado, and Mississippi LLC acts provide di-
rectly for waiver but include caveats. The Georgia and Washington LLC acts 
both provide that fiduciary duties may be waived—even going so far as to use 
the “elimination” language avoided by so many states—but add caveats, or 
“carve-outs,” from what may be eliminated.254 The Georgia LLC Act provision 
applicable to waiver of the duty of care is admirably clear, opting to restrict 
waiver only for “intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law.”255 The 
provision addressing the duty of loyalty, on the other hand, on its face only re-
stricts eliminating liability for a transaction breaching the operating agree-
ment.256 The language appears circular, but the most reasonable reading is that 
                                                        
252  CAL. CORP. CODE app. § 17005(d) (West 2014) (repealed 2014) (emphasis added). 
253  See USAT Reorganization L.L.C. v. Writer, No. D043230, 2004 WL 2538848, at *19 
(Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 10, 2004) (“The fiduciary obligations of a general partner with respect to 
matters fundamentally related to the partnership business cannot be waived or contracted 
away in the partnership agreement.” (quoting Everest Investors 8 v. McNeil Partners, 8 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 31, 40 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003))). 
254  See supra note 58 and accompanying text; see also RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 37. 
255  GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-305(4)(A)(i) (West 2003) (“To the extent that . . . a member or 
manager has duties (including fiduciary duties) and liabilities relating thereto to a limited 
liability company or to another member or manager: (A) The member’s or manager’s duties 
and liabilities may be expanded, restricted, or eliminated by provisions in . . . a written oper-
ating agreement; provided, however, that no such provision shall eliminate or limit the liabil-
ity of a member or manager: (i) For intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law 
. . . .”). 
256  Id. § 14-11-305(4)(A)(ii) (“To the extent that . . . a member or manager has duties (in-
cluding fiduciary duties) and liabilities relating thereto to a limited liability company or to 
another member or manager: (A) The member’s or manager’s duties and liabilities may be 
expanded, restricted, or eliminated by provisions in . . . a written operating agreement; pro-
vided, however, that no such provision shall eliminate or limit the liability of a member or 
manager: . . . (ii) For any transaction for which the person received a personal benefit in vio-
lation or breach of any provision of a written operating agreement . . . .”). 
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it prevents a waiver of the duty of loyalty from negating any other provision in 
the operating agreement. While Georgia courts have enforced waivers, they 
have not yet addressed the proper interpretation of this provision.257 The Wash-
ington LLC Act also limits restrictions on waiver to “intentional misconduct or 
a knowing violation of the law,”258 but does not restrict that limitation to the 
duty of loyalty. The Mississippi LLC Act uses different language but to the 
same end, prohibiting limiting liability for “[a]n intentional infliction of harm 
on the limited liability company or its members,” “[a]n intentional violation of 
criminal law,” and “a bad faith violation of the implied contractual covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing.”259 
The language of the Colorado LLC Act, on the other hand, introduces quite 
a bit of uncertainty.260 But for two words, the Colorado provision for waiver 
would allow for a level of contractual freedom that would rival Delaware and 
Nevada. That caveat, however, that anything is permitted “as long as any such 
provision is not manifestly unreasonable,” makes all the difference.261 The term 
“manifestly unreasonable” appears to be borrowed directly from the 
ULLCA,262 and as such it would be appropriate for courts to look to case law in 
states that have adopted the ULLCA. There are pitfalls to this approach, how-
ever. The “manifestly unreasonable” language in the ULLCA refers only to 
waivers of the duty of loyalty; a court should not apply the stricter “unreasona-
ble” standard the ULLCA applies to waivers of the duty of care.263 A court 
should also not limit a waiver of the duty of loyalty to the categories identified 
by the ULLCA.264 The greatest danger, however, is that the amorphous “mani-
festly unreasonable” standard gives courts an avenue to an ex post veto over an 
ex ante, contractual business decision and seriously erodes the certainty on 
which businesses thrive. 
                                                        
257  See supra Section II.B.1. 
258  WASH. REV. CODE § 25.15.038(6) (2016). Members are also barred from limiting the 
“implied contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing.” Id. 
259  MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-29-123(4) (2016). 
260  See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-108(1.5) (West 2006). 
261  Id. 
262  See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 103(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1996). (stating an operating 
agreement may not eliminate the loyalty duty or good faith obligation or “unreasonably re-
duce the duty of care,” but may identify “activities that do not violate the duty of loyalty, if 
not manifestly unreasonable,” and specify the vote necessary to approve the act or transac-
tion “that otherwise would violate the duty of loyalty”). 
263  See id. (stating an operating agreement may not eliminate the loyalty duty or good faith 
obligation or “unreasonably reduce the duty of care,” but may identify “activities that do not 
violate the duty of loyalty if not manifestly unreasonable,” and specify the vote necessary to 
approve the act or transaction “that otherwise would violate the duty of loyalty.” (emphasis 
added)). 
264  See id. 
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E. Exculpatory Approach 
Despite very similar language in the statutes for all six states providing on-
ly for exculpatory provisions covering breaches of fiduciary duties,265 there is 
no conformity in the case law of Connecticut, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, 
New York and North Carolina. No case law exists for Kentucky and Michigan. 
Connecticut courts have not yet addressed the enforceability of a waiver in the 
LLC context, but they have been unfriendly toward waivers in the LP con-
text.266 New York courts have proven unfriendly toward waivers in the LLC 
context.267 North Carolina, in contrast, has enforced waivers in the LLC context 
despite the statutory language providing only for exculpation.268 Louisiana has 
enforced a waiver, but only in a single case that resulted in an unpublished 
opinion.269 
The provisions in the Connecticut, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, New 
York, and North Carolina statutes only provide for exculpation from monetary 
liability; equitable relief may still be available to aggrieved parties.270 Parties 
forming an LLC in a state only explicitly providing for exculpation may be able 
to contract for a waiver in effect with a provision in the operating agreement 
that all remedies are limited to monetary damages.271 
F. Final Analysis of the Statutory Text 
Statutory text gives the strongest argument for the enforceability of waiv-
ers. Only in one state—North Carolina—have the courts been more amenable 
to waiver of fiduciary duty by LLC members than the statutory text would lead 
an observer to believe. The statutory texts in the remaining states (with notable 
exceptions) at least provide an attorney a base from which to argue for the en-
forcement of a waiver so long as it does not fall within one of the statutory 
carve-outs. The inclusion of “elimination” in the several states’ statutes leaves 
precious little room for an attorney to argue against enforceability outside of 
the difficult argument that the other side’s actions violated the implied contrac-
                                                        
265  See supra note 59 and accompanying text; see also RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 37. 
266  See, e.g., Konover Dev. Corp. v. Zeller, 635 A.2d 798, 805 (Conn. 1994) (holding that 
the fiduciary duties of a general partner in an LP cannot be waived). 
267  See, e.g., Pappas v. Tzolis, 982 N.E.2d 576 (N.Y. 2012). 
268  See, e.g., Kaplan v. O.K. Techs., L.L.C., 675 S.E.2d 133, 140 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (in-
terpreting the exculpatory provision of the North Carolina LLC Act as allowing the duties of 
members to be reduced by the operating agreement). 
269  See Broussard v. Tipton, No. 2013 CA 1268, 2014 WL 3559371, at *1–2 (La. Ct. App. 
Apr. 24, 2014). 
270  See, e.g., Solar Cells, Inc. v. True N. Partners, L.L.C., No. Civ.A. 19477, 2002 WL 
749163, at *4 (Del. Ch. April 25, 2002) (finding a waiver of liability from any conflict of 
interest did not prevent injunctive relief). 
271  The enforceability of such provisions is outside of the scope of this article. It should be 
noted, however, that a planning attorney should be, all else equal, less confident in the en-
forceability of a provision designed to effect something that the legislature has chosen not to 
expressly provide for in the statute. 
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tual covenant of good faith and fair dealing, waiver notwithstanding. Unfortu-
nately, Colorado and California have statutes so vague and ambiguous, respec-
tively, that a planning attorney cannot with any certainty predict whether a 
waiver will be enforceable. The exculpatory provisions of some states also pro-
vide scant protection, although there is case law very favorable to the enforce-
ment of waivers in North Carolina. 
IV. ANALYSIS OF LP CASE LAW 
If LLC case law on-point is not available,272 it is instructive to turn to LP 
case law to better predict how a court will treat a particular provision.273 LLCs 
share a doctrinal foundation in contracts with LPs that corporations do not.274 
Unfortunately, courts may look to LP law for guidance even where the applica-
ble LLC statute takes a more liberal stance toward waiver of fiduciary duty 
than the applicable LP statute.  
While courts have upheld waivers, there is no consensus regarding the en-
forceability of waivers in general partnerships.275 However, courts have en-
forced provisions in partnership agreements allowing partners to compete with 
the firm and allowing self-dealing.276 Courts have also interpreted provisions in 
LP agreements narrowly in order to avoid enforcing a waiver of fiduciary du-
ties.277 
A. Delaware Case Law 
Delaware courts have been very open to waivers of fiduciary duties in 
LPs.278 The Delaware Supreme Court upheld a provision setting the fiduciary 
                                                        
272  See supra note 227 and accompanying text (Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, 
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New 
Mexico, Washington, and Wisconsin). 
273  See Wayne M. Gazur, The Limited Liability Company Experiment: Unlimited Flexibility, 
Uncertain Role, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135, 138 (1995) (positing that courts will rely 
heavily on analogies to more familiar entity forms in developing LLC case law); see also 
RIBSTEIN, supra note 3, at 143 (arguing one of the chief advantages of the LP form is the 
large body of legal precedent available). 
274  See, e.g., RIBSTEIN, supra note 3, at 33. 
275  Compare Wilson v. Button, 404 F.2d 309, 309 (5th Cir. 1968), Hooper v. Yoder, 737 
P.2d 852, 853 (Colo. 1987), Covalt v. High, 675 P.2d 999, 999 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983), and 
Singer v. Singer, 634 P.2d 766, 767 (Okla. Ct. App. 1981), with Palmisano v. Mascaro, 611 
So. 2d 632, 644 (La. Ct. App. 1992), and Lyall v. Grayco Builders, Inc., 584 N.Y.S.2d 465, 
468–70 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992). 
276  Larry E. Ribstein, The Revised Uniform Partnership Act: Not Ready for Prime Time, 49 
BUS. LAW. 45, 57 & nn.93–94 (1993). 
277  See Labovitz v. Dolan, 545 N.E.2d 304, 304–05 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (interpreting a term 
giving the general partner “sole discretion” in decision making as not waiving the fiduciary 
duties of the general partner). 
278  See, e.g., Cincinnati SMSA Ltd. P’ship v. Cincinnati Bell Cellular Sys. Co., 708 A.2d 
989, 993–94 (Del. 1998) (holding entrance by limited partner into the personal communica-
tions services market did not meet the narrow definition of “cellular service” and thus was 
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duties of the general partner to mirror those that apply in the Delaware corpora-
tion law in Gotham Partners, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P.,279 but 
made a questionable assertion in dicta. The Delaware Supreme Court could not 
let a statement in the Vice Chancellor’s decision stating that the Delaware LP 
Act “expressly authorizes the elimination, modification or enhancement of . . . 
fiduciary duties in the written agreement governing the limited partnership” 
pass uncriticized.280 The court also noted a similar statement in Sonet v. Timber 
                                                                                                                                
governed by a waiver broadly allowing competition with the LP); Lonergan v. EPE Holdings 
L.L.C., 5 A.3d 1008, 1016–19 (Del. Ch. 2010) (refusing to substitute the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing for fiduciary duty analysis where the LP agreement eliminated all 
fiduciary duties); Gelfman v. Weeden Inv’rs, L.P., 792 A.2d 977, 984–87 (Del. Ch. 2001) 
(interpreting facially inconsistent provisions of the LP as replacing the default objective fair-
ness with a scienter-based standard of loyalty); Cantor Fitzgerald, LP v. Cantor, No. CIV.A. 
18101, 2001 WL 1456494, at *4–6 (Del. Ch. Nov. 5, 2001) (holding distributions were made 
in accordance with the partnership agreement and thus were covered by waiver cleansing all 
decisions by the general partner made “in good faith and in accordance with the terms of 
the” partnership agreement); Kahn v. Icahn, No. CIV. A. 15916, 1998 WL 832629, at *3 
(Del. Ch. Nov. 12, 1998) (refusing to interpret a provision of the LP agreement allowing di-
rect competition as inapplicable to business usurpation); Sonet v. Timber Co., 722 A.2d 319, 
324–26 (Del. Ch. 1998) (enforcing an LP agreement giving the general partner the “sole dis-
cretion” regarding decisions on extraordinary acts or transactions and allowing the general 
partner to not consider the interests of the limited partners in resolving conflicts of interest); 
In re Cencom Cable Income Partners, L.P. Litig., No. 14634, 1996 WL 74726, at *4–5 (Del. 
Ch. Feb. 15, 1996) (recognizing than an LP agreement can create a “safe harbor” for certain 
types or categories of transactions and holding that the transaction in question fell into such a 
contractually created safe harbor); In re Marriott Hotel Props. II Ltd. P’ship Unitholders 
Litig., No. 14961, 1996 WL 342040, at *6–7 (Del. Ch. June 12, 1996) (holding that any 
breach of fiduciary duties due to application Revlon duties was foreclosed by provisions in 
the LP agreement giving the general partner “absolute discretion” to veto the transfer of lim-
ited partnership units); Wilmington Leasing, Inc. v. Parrish Leasing Co., No. 15202, 1996 
WL 752364, at *14–15 (Del. Ch. Dec. 23, 1996) (holding that removal of the general partner 
could not be a breach of fiduciary when done pursuant to a provision of the LP agreement so 
long as reasonable and in good faith); see also In re Scarff, No. 03-54723 ASW, 2010 WL 
4052917, at *5–8, 13 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2010) (refusing to supplant contractually 
defined fiduciary duties with Delaware common law fiduciary duties); Aris Multi-Strategy 
Fund, L.P. v. Accipiter Life Scis. Fund II (QP), L.P., No. 601110-2009, 2010 WL 2033128 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 21, 2010) (finding that fiduciary duties were modified sufficiently to de-
feat a breach of fiduciary duty claim by a “sole discretion” clause and an exculpatory 
clause); Barrett v. Toroyan, 813 N.Y.S.2d 415, 28 A.D. 331, 332 (App. Div. 2006) (holding 
that under Delaware law a provision of the LP agreement allowing general partner to engage 
in “ ‘other businesses’ ” allowed those general partners “to pursue business opportunities that 
might otherwise have gone to the partnership”). But see Forsythe v. ESC Fund Mgmt. Co. 
(U.S.), Inc., No. 1091-VCL, 2007 WL 2982247, at *7–8 (Del. Ch. Oct. 9, 2007) (holding 
that waiver of the duty of loyalty in effect raised the duty of care); see also Venture Inv. 
Partners, L.L.C. v. JT Venture Partners L.L.C., No. 064353, 2007 WL 4098850, at *7 (Mass. 
Super. Ct. Oct. 25, 2007) (finding under Delaware law that the waiver in question did not 
cover the transactions alleged). 
279  Gotham Partners, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P., 817 A.2d 160, 163–64 (Del. 
2002). 
280  Id. at 167 (alterations in original) (quoting Gotham Partners, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty 
Partners, L.P., No. 15754, 2000 WL 1476663, at *10 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 2000)). 
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Co.281 The statements in both cases were dicta rather than binding precedent,282 
and that particular issue was not before the Delaware Supreme Court for re-
view.283 That did not stop the court from stating that while it would be inappro-
priate for them “to express an advisory opinion on a matter not before” them, if 
they were expressing an advisory opinion it would be that the fiduciary duties 
of a general partner cannot be eliminated by contract.284 The court came to this 
conclusion through a dubious bit of statutory interpretation, admitting that “on 
its face Section 17-1101(d) [the statute] permits the fiduciary duty of a general 
partner to be expanded or restricted without limit by the terms of a partnership 
agreement.”285 The court may have reasoned that the plain meaning of the stat-
utory provision reflected poor draftsmanship by the Delaware legislature rather 
than its intent, or, most likely, both. The Delaware legislators promptly in-
formed the Delaware Supreme Court that they did in fact mean what they orig-
inally wrote by amending both the Delaware LLC Act and LP Act to explicitly 
allow the elimination of fiduciary duties.286 Clearly the Delaware Supreme 
Court either misinterpreted the intentions of the Delaware legislature or failed 
to faithfully effect that intent. 
B. Maryland Case Law 
Maryland has also proven friendly to waiver in the LP context. The “Clan-
cy” in Clancy v. King was Tom Clancy, the author of bestselling thrillers, in-
cluding the Jack Ryan novels such as The Hunt for Red October and Patriot 
Games.287 He formed a LP with his then wife, Wanda King, to “engage in ac-
tivities relating to the writing, publishing and sale of books.”288 Each held a 1 
percent general partnership interest and a 49 percent limited partnership inter-
est.289 The LP contracted with S & R Literary, Inc., to form a joint venture to 
publish books under Clancy’s name that had been ghostwritten by another au-
thor.290 When, after several books had been published, Clancy moved to have 
his name removed from the series, his now ex-wife King sued, alleging that he 
                                                        
281  Id. at 167 n.12 (citing Sonet v. Timber Co., 722 A.2d 319, 323 (Del. Ch. 1998) (stating 
that section 17-1101(d) “apparently [allows] broad license to enhance, reform, or even elimi-
nate fiduciary duty protections”)). 
282  Id. at 167. 
283  Id. 
284  Id. at 168. 
285  Id. at 167 n.13 (quoting MARTIN I. LUBAROFF & PAUL M. ALTMAN, LUBEROFF & ALTMAN 
ON DELAWARE LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS §§ 11.2.6, 13.1.2 (1995 & Supp. 2002)). 
286  See Edwin W. Hecker, Jr., Fiduciary Duties in Business Entities, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 975, 
1019 (2006); see also Steele, supra note 231, at 10–14, 17 (discussing the evolution of the 
Delaware LP Act). 
287  See Clancy v. King, 954 A.2d 1092, 1095 (Md. 2008). 
288  Id. 
289  Id. 
290  Id. at 1095–96. 
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breached his fiduciary duty to her and the LP.291 The Court of Appeals (the 
Court of Appeals is the highest court in the Maryland court system) noted that 
Maryland law permitted LP agreements to modify the duty of loyalty and that 
such modifications had been enforced.292 The Court of Appeals reversed the 
decision of the trial court, holding that the LP agreement “clearly and unam-
biguously limits the duty of loyalty” owed by Clancy by explicitly allowing 
him to compete with the LP.293 The only remaining question, then, was whether 
Clancy exercised his discretion in good faith, an issue the Court of Appeals was 
unable to resolve on the record.294 
C. California Case Law 
California courts have addressed the enforceability of judicial waivers in 
LP agreements, first addressing the issue in BT-I v. Equitable Life Assurance 
Society of the United States.295 A California state appellate court held that fidu-
ciary duties cannot be contracted away through the LP agreement.296 BT-I, a 
general partnership, entered into a general partnership to develop commercial 
real estate with Equitable.297 Six years into the project, the parties replaced the 
original general partnership with an LP.298 BT-I was the limited partner and 
held a minority stake.299 The LP agreement gave the general partner, Equitable, 
broad powers and removed any responsibility of the general partner to prevent 
any lender from exercising remedies pursuant to a loan made to the LP.300 In an 
effort to squeeze out BT-I, Equitable arranged with the LP’s primary lender to 
purchase its loans to the LP.301 Equitable ostensibly offered the opportunity to 
purchase the loan to the LP, but neither the LP nor BT-I had the funds to pur-
chase the loans, and unbeknownst to BT-I, the lender had secretly agreed to al-
low Equitable to match the highest bidder.302 Equitable subsequently refused to 
refinance the project and foreclosed on the property.303 
BT-I sued Equitable for, among other things, breach of fiduciary duties.304 
In characterizing the relationship between BT-I and Equitable, the court refer-
                                                        
291  Id. at 1097. 
292  Id. at 1100–01 (citing MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 9A-103(b)(3)(i); Della Ratta 
v. Larkin, 856 A.2d 643, 652–53 (Md. 2004)). 
293  Id. at 1101. 
294  Id. at 1106, 1109. 
295  BT-I v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of the U.S., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 811, 811 (Ct. App. 
1999). 
296  Id. at 816. 
297  Id. at 813–14. 
298  Id. at 814. 
299  Id. 
300  Id. 
301  Id. 
302  Id. 
303  Id. 
304  Id. at 815. 
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enced partnerships with no effort to distinguish between a general partnership 
and an LP.305 The California Revised Limited Partnership Act306 at that time 
gave partners in an LP freedom to contract around many default provisions,307 
but with important limits.308 Relying on decisions from other states, the court 
held the purchase of the debt was a breach of fiduciary duty.309 Relying on a 
general partnership case, AB Group v. Wertin, the court held that a waiver of 
fiduciary duties in an LP agreement is unenforceable.310 While the court in 
Wertin declined to void the waiver in question, explaining that only fiduciary 
obligations that are fundamental to the relationship between the parties cannot 
be waived, the court in BT-I extended the Wertin court’s reasoning, finding the 
relationship between BT-I and Equitable fundamental and refusing to enforce 
the waiver.311 The court specifically discussed Labovitz v. Dolan, in which an 
Illinois court chose to interpret a provision giving the general partner “sole dis-
cretion” over the management of the LP as an unenforceable waiver, rather 
than narrowly interpreting the provision as not affecting fiduciary duties.312  
The BT-I court was clear that the provision could not have been written in 
such a way as to cleanse the transaction in question, implying that it would in-
terpret a waiver of fiduciary duty narrowly.313 In a statement showing a strong 
suspicion toward freedom of contract, the court went on to insist that “the fact 
that the act allows the parties to structure many aspects of their relationship is 
not a license to freely engage in self-dealing—it remains [the court’s] responsi-
bility to delimit the outer bounds of permissible conduct by a fiduciary” (note 
that the court implicitly claims control over defining who is in a fiduciary rela-
tionship with whom in order to limit the scope of permissible contractual defini-
tion by partners in an LP).314 The court also likely felt that the discretion given 
to Equitable to respond to lender actions was intended to protect Equitable from 
being forced to put more money into the venture, not to give it a path by which 
it could squeeze out minority investors. 
                                                        
305  See id. (“Partnership is a fiduciary relationship, and partners are held to the standards and 
duties of a trustee in their dealings with each other.”). 
306  See CAL. CORP. CODE § 15611 (West 2005) (repealed 2010). 
307  Id. § 15618 (repealed 2010). 
308  Id. § 15643 (repealed 2010). 
309  BT-I, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 815–16 (relying on Wartski v. Bedford, 926 F.2d 11, 20 (1st 
Cir. 1991) (applying Massachusetts law); Konover Dev. Corp. v. Zeller, 635 A.2d 798, 808 
(Conn. 1994); Thomas v. Schmelzer, 796 P.2d 1026, 1032–33 (Idaho Ct. App. 1990); Labo-
vitz v. Dolan, 545 N.E.2d 304, 310, 313 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); Dean Operations, Inc. v. One 
Seventy Assocs., 896 P.2d 1012, 1021–22 (Kan. 1995); Appletree Square I Ltd. P’ship v. 
Investmark, Inc., 494 N.W.2d 889, 893 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993); Ebest v. Bruce, 734 S.W.2d 
915, 922 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987)). 
310  Id. at 816 (relying on AB Group v. Wertin, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 652 (Ct. App. 1997)). 
311  Id. 
312  Id. (quoting Labovitz, 545 N.E.2d 304). 
313  Id. at 817. 
314  Id. at 817–18. 
PACE - 16 NEV. L.J. 1085 - FINAL 6/20/2016  5:58 PM 
1126 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:1085  
The California courts reaffirmed the approach taken in BT-I in Woodson v. 
Legacy Partners 2323 L.P.315 Legacy Partners 387 L.P. (LP 387) was an equal 
partner in a partnership.316 That partnership later became a general partner in a 
California LP organized to purchase and develop real estate in San Francis-
co.317 The general partners of LP 387 refinanced the debt for the development 
owned by the LP in order to prevent foreclosure and, in doing so, bought out 
their original partner’s partnership interest.318 The general partners then orga-
nized a new LP, Legacy Partners 2323 L.P., to own the development.319 
Woodson, a limited partner of LP 387, sued for breach of fiduciary duty, 
alleging the new structure gave additional benefits to the general partners of LP 
387 at the expense of the limited partners.320 In its defense, the LP argued the 
refinancing was authorized by the LP agreement as a justifiable exercise of the 
general partners’ business judgment,321 which is a bit odd, as the California 
Corporations Code appears to hold corporate directors to a stricter statutory de-
fault standard than partners.322 The court avoided application of the business 
judgment rule by explaining that, under California law, the rule only applies to 
corporations and not to LPs.323 The court instead looked to a “fiduciary duty of 
good faith and fair dealing” found in the code.324 There is an inherent confusion 
created by a statutory fiduciary duty borrowing terms of art directly from the 
contract law concept of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. That 
confusion was exacerbated by an explanation of the duty of good faith, which 
appeared to incorporate the business judgment rule, immediately subsequent to 
disavowal of the business judgment rule by the court.325  
                                                        
315  Woodson v. Legacy Partners 2323 L.P., No. A100627, 2003 WL 22795886, at *4 (Cal. 
Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2003). 
316  Id. at *1. 
317  Id. 
318  Id. 
319  Id. 
320  Id. 
321  Id. 
322  Compare CAL. CORP. CODE § 309(a) (West 2014) (“A director shall perform the duties of 
a director . . . with such care . . . as an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use 
under similar circumstances.”), with id. § 16404(c) (“A partner’s duty of care . . . is limited 
to refraining from engaging in grossly negligent or reckless conduct, intentional misconduct, 
or a knowing violation of law.”). 
323  Woodson, 2003 WL 22795886, at *2 (relying on Lamden v. La Jolla Shores Club-
dominium Homeowners Ass’n, 21 Cal. 4th 249, 259–60 (Ct. App. 1999)). 
324  Id. at *3. The current version of this “duty” is housed in section 16404 of the California 
Corporations Code. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 16404(d) (West 2014) (“A partner shall dis-
charge the duties to the partnership and other partners under this chapter or under the part-
nership agreement and exercise any rights consistently with the obligation of good faith and 
fair dealing.”). 
325  See Woodson, 2003 WL 22795886, at *3 (“These characteristics—limited investor liabil-
ity, delegation of authority to management, and fiduciary duty owed by management to in-
vestors—are similar to those existing in corporate investment, where it has long been the 
rule that directors are not liable to stockholders for mistakes made in the exercise of honest 
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Satisfied that they had made everything perfectly clear, the court stated the 
issue was a question of fact that must be resolved at trial and moved on to the 
LP’s defense that the actions of the general partners were permitted by the op-
erating agreement.326 Relying on BT-I, the court found that the refinancing was 
a matter “fundamentally related to the partnership business” and hence could 
not be protected from judicial scrutiny by waiver.327 While the LP agreement 
adopted a “kitchen sink” approach to waiving duties,328 there is nothing in the 
language of the opinion to suggest that any wording would evade a judge’s veto 
power. It should be noted that the court relied on judge-made law from BT-I, 
while making no attempt to reconcile the waiver in the LP agreement with the 
provision of the LP Act governing modification of fiduciary duties. While the 
court in BT-I failed to undertake a full statutory analysis, there is no reason to 
expect a court to give close scrutiny to even a poor decision by a peer court 
when the reviewing court is not at liberty to reverse the precedent. 
With negative LLC case law, a confused statutory approach, and negative 
LP case law, there is little hope for the enforcement of a waiver of fiduciary du-
                                                                                                                                
business judgment, or for losses incurred in the good faith performance of their duties when 
they have used such care as an ordinarily prudent person would use . . . , a general partner 
may not be held liable for mistakes made or losses incurred in the good faith exercise of rea-
sonable business judgment.” (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Wyler v. 
Feuer, 149 Cal. Rptr. 626, 632–33 (Ct. App. 1978))); id. (“[T]he presumption created by the 
business judgment rule can be rebutted . . . by affirmative allegations of fact which, if prov-
en, would establish fraud, bad faith, overreaching or an unreasonable failure to investigate 
material facts.” (second alteration in original) (quoting Lee v Interinsurance Exch., 57 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 798, 811 (Ct. App. 1996))). 
326  Id. at *3–4. 
327  Id. at *4 (quoting BT-I v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of the U.S., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
811, 816 (Ct. App. 1999)). 
328  See id. at *4 n.4 (“The LP 387 partnership agreement gave any one of the managing gen-
eral partners the powers ‘to make all decisions with respect to the business and affairs of the 
Partnership and to take such action for and on behalf of the Partnership as he may deem nec-
essary or appropriate to enable the Partnership to carry out its purpose,’ including: ‘(a) to 
borrow money for and on behalf of the Partnership upon such terms and conditions as he, in 
his sole discretion, deems necessary or appropriate; [and][¶] (b) (in order to secure any loans 
to the Partnership . . . or for Partnership purposes) to convey, mortgage, pledge, hypothecate, 
for and on behalf of the Partnership and upon such terms and conditions as he, in his sole 
discretion, deems necessary or appropriate, all or any part of the Partnership assets. . . .’ Ad-
ditionally, ‘[e]ach partner, in his individual capacity or otherwise, [was] . . . free to engage 
in, to conduct or to participate in any business or activity whatsoever, including, without lim-
itation, the acquisition, development, management and exploitation of real property, without 
any accountability, liability or obligation whatsoever to the Partnership or to any other Part-
ner, even if such business or activity competes with or is enhanced by the business of the 
partnership. Further, the General Partners, in the exercise of their power and authority under 
this Agreement, may contract and otherwise deal with or otherwise obligate the Partnership 
to entities in which any one or more of the Partners may have an ownership or other finan-
cial interest.’ Under the agreement, the general partners had no liability to either the Partner-
ship or any other partner ‘for any error of judgment or for any mistakes of fact or law or for 
anything which they may do or refrain from doing hereafter in connection with the business 
and affairs of the Partnership except in the case of willful misconduct or gross negli-
gence.’ ”). 
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ty under California law. LP case law only bolsters the approach, hostile to 
waiver, taken in Writer.329 
D. Connecticut Case Law 
While Connecticut courts have not addressed whether members of an LLC 
can contract out of fiduciary duties, they have analogized LLCs to LPs for the 
purposes of applying fiduciary duties.330 The Connecticut Supreme Court an-
swered the question for partners in a LP in its 1994 decision, Konover Devel-
opment Corp. v. Zeller.331 The parties and another investor formed a Connecti-
cut LP in order to build a shopping mall, with Konover serving as the general 
partner.332 The parties were left as the sole investors in the venture and as equal 
partners after the other investor sold his interest to Zeller.333 Rapidly rising 
property values led to a disagreement among the parties over the price the LP 
would pay for a parcel of property owned by Zeller and over whether to aban-
don development in order to reap an immediate profit from the increased prop-
erty values.334 The parties amended the LP agreement to give Konover the right 
to terminate the LP if, at its sole discretion, it determined the project was no 
longer feasible.335 Subsequently, Zeller would own all assets of the LP but 
would be liable to Konover for all of its “out-of-pocket” expenditures.336 After 
a series of setbacks, Konover terminated the LP and requested reimbursement 
for $1.1 million in expenses.337 
Konover sued to force payment of the requested reimbursement, and Zeller 
filed a counterclaim alleging breach of fiduciary duty.338 On appeal, Zeller spe-
cifically argued that, despite the “sole discretion” language in their agreement, 
Konover should have been held to the heightened standard imposed on a fidu-
ciary in determining that the project was no longer feasible.339 The trial judge 
instructed the jury that Konover must merely have been acting “reasonably.”340 
                                                        
329  See USAT Reorganization L.L.C. v. Writer, No. D043230, 2004 WL 2538848 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Nov. 10, 2004). 
330  Savanna Inv’rs, L.L.C. v. Vaughn, No. X08CV084012896S, 2008 WL 4021333, at *6 
n.6 (Con. Super. Ct. July 30, 2008). 
331  Konover Dev. Corp. v. Zeller, 635 A.2d 798 (Conn. 1994). 
332  Id. at 800. 
333  Id. 
334  Id. 
335  Id. at 801. 
336  Id. 
337  Id. at 802. 
338  Id. 
339  Id. 
340  Id. at 803 n.7 The jury instructions provided in part: 
The exercise by the plaintiff of the contractual right it bargained for and obtained would not be a 
breach of its duty under the contract, provided the decision was made reasonably based upon a 
careful review of the relevant information the general partner had before it. 
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Konover’s argument that the agreement gave it sole discretion to terminate the 
partnership fell on deaf ears, and the court refused to characterize the claim as a 
breach of contract dispute.341 The court took advantage of poor lawyering by 
Konover’s attorney and refused on procedural grounds to determine whether 
the Connecticut LP Act allowed such a waiver.342 Were the court to have exam-
ined the statute, it would have discovered language that implied indirectly that 
fiduciary duties could be modified by the LP agreement.343  
The court appeared to see no conflict between its statement that the exer-
cise of Konover’s fiduciary duty “was to be viewed in light of all of the facts of 
the case”344 and the fact that Konover and Zeller had bargained at arms’ length 
to give Konover the discretion to terminate the partnership. The court claimed 
to take a “middle ground” between contractual freedom and respect of the fidu-
ciary relationship,345 but it is difficult to reconcile the court’s refusal to enforce 
the contractual provision in question with any sort of middle ground. Konover 
attempted to rely on an Illinois case, but the court distinguished it on the basis 
that the breach occurred when the parties were at arms’ length.346 However, it 
is the relationship of the parties at the time of contract formation, not breach, 
that should govern as a matter of application of contract law doctrine, and 
Konover and Zeller were at arms’ length at the time the LP agreement was re-
vised.347 
Further eroding its earlier reference to a middle ground, the court added 
that “in circumstances such as these,” the state’s interest in freedom of contract 
did not deserve as much deference as its interest in maintaining a fiduciary rela-
tionship.348 The court gave no guidance as to what type of waiver would be en-
forced, and indeed no solace that any waiver would pass muster. It is also worth 
noting that neither of the cases relied upon by the court are from a jurisdiction 
allowing waiver by LLC members and one of the cases, despite being identified 
                                                                                                                                
. . . If you find that the agreement was that the plaintiff had sole discretion to terminate the pro-
ject and exercised that discretion, reasonably you would find that the plaintiff did not violate its 
fiduciary duty. 
Id. 
341  Id. at 804. 
342  Id. at 804 n.8 (demonstrating that counsel for Konover failed to claim that the applicable 
provision of the Connecticut LP Act governed the issue and allowed such a waiver). 
343  CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 34-17 (West 2015) (“Except as provided . . . in the partnership 
agreement, a general partner of a limited partnership shall have all the rights and powers and 
be subject to all the restrictions of a partner in a partnership without limited partners.”). 
344  Zeller, 635 A.2d. at 804. 
345  Id. at 806. 
346  Id. at 807 n.13 (citing Hamilton v. Williams, 573 N.E.2d 1276, 1288 (Ill. Ct. App. 
1991)). 
347  See id. at 807–08 & n.13. 
348  Id. at 808. 
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as such, was not an LP case at all.349 The court felt no need to examine the stat-
utory text in balancing between the threat that “an overly strict interpretation of 
partnership loyalty might stifle the limited partnership form” and the threat that 
an active general partner might take advantage of a passive limited partner, giv-
ing greater weight to the latter.350 The court likely felt Zeller could not have in-
tended to give Konover license to act unreasonably, and the court may have al-
so seen the fiduciary duty claim as a way to hold Konover accountable for a 
request for reimbursement of expenses that they felt were unreasonable. 
A Massachusetts court, interpreting Connecticut law, felt confident enough 
in the development of the case law post-Zeller to avoid enforcing a waiver pro-
vision in a Connecticut LP agreement in Sizemore v. I-R Maple Corp.351 After 
detailing an extremely complicated set of facts,352 the court addressed the claim 
for breach of fiduciary duty. The court applied the “Zeller standard of fairness” 
test applicable to a complex commercial relationship between sophisticated 
parties.353 Noting the addition in Spector v. Konover of a requirement of the 
consent of the limited partners supposedly implicit in the Zeller test,354 the 
court rejected the defendants’ argument that the waiver provided prior consent 
for the transaction, stating, “In general, the terms of a limited partnership 
agreement cannot negate the fiduciary duty between partners.”355 While the 
court saw Connecticut law as unclear as to how, or even if, the Zeller test 
should be applied, it clearly did not see the Zeller test as leaving room for a 
waiver to foreclose judicial scrutiny and veto.356 The “middle ground” ap-
proach of Zeller clearly still stands well outside of the Delaware approach.357 
A Connecticut court did, however, finally find some room for a waiver of 
fiduciary duties in Merrick v. Cummin.358 Merrick, a limited partner in a Dela-
ware LP that was organized to own venture capital investment funds,359 sought 
relief for a usurpation of a business opportunity by the general partners.360 Mer-
                                                        
349  See id. (relying on Wartski v. Bedford, 926 F.2d 11 (1st Cir. 1991) (stating fiduciary du-
ties in a general partnership cannot be waived); Labovitz v. Dolan, 545 N.E.2d 304 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1989)). 
350  Id. at 809 (deciding that “wise public policy counsels the retention of the fiduciary prin-
ciple”). 
351  Sizemore v. I-R Maple Corp., No. 012773, 2003 WL 21246178, at *9 (Mass. Super. Ct. 
April 28, 2003). 
352  Id. at *1–5. 
353  Id. at *7. 
354  Id. at *7–8 (relying on Spector v. Konover, 747 A.2d 39, 44 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000)). 
355  Id. at *8. 
356  Id. at *8–9. 
357  See, e.g., Cavolick v. DeSimone, No. X03CV990501611S, 2003 WL 21976911, at *5–6 
(Conn. Super. Ct. July 30, 2003) (dismissing the waiver provision of the LP as “not surpris-
ing”—and ineffective—given the larger investment and risk taken on by the general partner). 
358  Merrick v. Cummin, 919 A.2d 495 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007). 
359  The LP was organized under Delaware law, but the court applied Connecticut law. Id. at 
498 n.3. 
360  Id. at 497. 
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rick, however, had contractually agreed in settlement of an earlier arbitration 
proceeding not to bring any future arbitration proceeding.361 The arbitrator 
found that the earlier agreement barred Merrick from challenging the transac-
tion in question, and Merrick asked the court to vacate the ruling as void 
against Connecticut public policy because it amounted to a waiver of fiduciary 
duties.362 The court refused Merrick’s request, noting that both parties were 
equally sophisticated businesspeople and finding no clear public policy 
“against the voluntary waiver of future claims concerning breach of that [fidu-
ciary] duty.”363 The court made only a cursory reference to Zeller and dis-
missed it, along with other cases voiding various types of waivers as factually 
distinguishable.364 The court made no effort to apply the reasoning of Zeller to 
the facts of the case. 
The court’s decision in Merrick is difficult to reconcile with Zeller, and it 
is unclear whether it is an aberration; a special, narrow rule; or indicative of a 
new openness to waivers of fiduciary duties in Connecticut courts.365 The 
openness to waiver in Merrick was likely due at least in part to the extremely 
sophisticated parties involved. Without any LLC case law on-point, the confu-
sion in the LP case law created by Merrick leaves the enforceability of waiver 
of fiduciary duty very uncertain under Connecticut law. 
E. Massachusetts Case Law 
Prior to the enforceability of a waiver of fiduciary duty being upheld (in 
the LLC context) in Pointer,366 the leading case on waiver of fiduciary duties in 
Massachusetts business associations had long been an LP case, Wartski v. Bed-
ford.367 The partnership at issue in Wartski fell into the familiar scenario of an 
inventor teamed up with a business-savvy deep pocket.368 Wartski and Bedford 
partnered to develop and market a data collector for motor vehicles that 
Wartski had invented.369 The venture was formally organized as a Massachu-
setts LP, with Wartski and Bedford as general partners and two other experts 
involved in the project as limited partners.370 The sole asset of the LP was a 
newly formed corporation, to which the LP transferred Wartski’s invention.371 
                                                        
361  Id. 
362  Id. at 497–98. 
363  Id. at 499. 
364  Id. 
365  But see Hartley v. Boyd, No. X02CV034004679SCLD, 2008 WL 442142, at *11 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Feb. 04, 2008) (reiterating that fiduciary duties cannot be waived and applying the 
Zeller test with no discussion of Merrick). 
366  Pointer v. Castellani, 918 N.E.2d 805, 821 (Mass. 2009). 
367  Wartski v. Bedford, 926 F.2d 11 (1st Cir. 1991). 
368  Id. at 14–15. 
369  Id. at 14. 
370  Id. at 15. 
371  Id. 
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The corporation had some initial success attracting equity financing from inves-
tors but struggled nonetheless, leading to a dispute between Wartski and Bed-
ford, which culminated in Wartski leaving employment with the corporation 
(although he remained a general partner of the LP and director of the corpora-
tion).372 Bedford later offered to buy-out the outside investors at a nominal sum 
when the corporation reached the point of insolvency.373 Bedford pushed ahead 
with his plan over Wartski’s protests that the shares be shared with the LP, tell-
ing him: “That was life in the big city.”374 Bedford was able to successfully 
gain control of the corporation over a period of time for around ten dollars and 
eventually negotiated its sale for over one million dollars.375 
Wartski sued Bedford for breach of fiduciary duty owed to Wartski as a re-
sult of the LP relationship.376 Wartski argued that Bedford had violated his duty 
to offer the business opportunity to purchase the shares of the outside investors 
at a nominal sum.377 Bedford countered by arguing the LP agreement author-
ized his actions.378 The LP agreement contained an extremely broad waiver 
permitting the general partners to compete directly with the LP.379 The court 
went so far as to admit that the contractual language may have cleansed Bed-
ford’s actions, but held the provision was ineffective as a waiver of fiduciary 
duty.380 The court failed to engage in any interpretation of statutory text or to 
cite to a single case interpreting Massachusetts law (or to any case interpreting 
another state’s law discussed in this article).381 The court saw Bedford as using 
the agreement to take advantage of Wartski, but the court failed to take into ac-
count that Wartski did not do everything he could to protect his contractual 
rights. For example, Wartski never hired an attorney and did not make an offer 
to the other investors to counter Bedford’s offer.382 While the court made sure 
to note that Wartski relied upon Bedford’s superior knowledge of and experi-
ence in business and financing,383 its holding left no room for sophisticated par-
                                                        
372  Id. 
373  Id. at 16. 
374  Id. 
375  Id. at 17–18. 
376  Id. at 12. 
377  Id. at 18–19. 
378  Id. at 18–20. 
379  Id. at 20 (“Section 5.4 of the agreement states: ‘General Partners shall not be prevented 
from engaging in other activities for profit, whether in research and development or other-
wise, and whether or not competitive with the business of the partnership.’ ”). 
380  Id. (“[E]ven if the partnership agreement can be interpreted as [Bedford] claims, it can-
not nullify the fiduciary duty owed by Bedford to the partnership. The fiduciary duty of part-
ners is an integral part of the partnership agreement whether or not expressly set forth there-
in. It cannot be negated by the words of the partnership agreement.”). 
381  See id. (first citing Labovitz v. Dolan, 545 N.E.2d 304, 310 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); and then 
citing Irwin v. West End Development Co., 342 F. Supp. 687, 701 (D. Colo. 1972), aff’d in 
part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 481 F.2d 34 (10th Cir. 1973)). 
382  Id. at 16–17. 
383  Id. at 20. 
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ties to waive fiduciary duties. Under the highly questionable reasoning of 
Wartski, Massachusetts courts would retain the power to veto contractual pro-
visions years after the contract was signed. 
F. Final Analysis of LP Case Law 
Seven states remain without case law guidance in either the LLC or LP 
context.384 One state—California—has negative case law for waivers in both 
the LLC and LP context. Taken together with the statutory ambiguity in Cali-
fornia, and the subsequent repeal of both the LLC and LP Acts, it seems clear 
that a waiver will not be enforced. Connecticut has well established negative 
case law in the LP context, no case law in the LLC context, and offers only 
scant statutory protection, so the same can likely be said for Connecticut. How-
ever, Merrick shows that Connecticut courts may not be entirely hostile to 
waivers if they are confident that both parties are equally sophisticated.385 
While the decision in Pointer386 (an LLC case) and the statutory text would ap-
pear to provide ample support for the enforceability of a waiver of fiduciary du-
ties in Massachusetts, courts are likely to still find Wartski highly persuasive. 
The LP case law for Delaware tracks the approach of Delaware LLC case 
law—strongly supporting the freedom to contract. The dicta in Gotham Part-
ners indicating that a provision completely eliminating fiduciary duties would 
not be enforced387 has been nullified by statute.388 
V. MACRO IMPLICATIONS 
The current state of the law raises a number of concerns. The statutes in 
many states are detrimental to economic growth and are unlikely to meet the 
interests of state legislatures. Judges have exacerbated these statutory failings 
by sometimes interpreting the applicable LLC act poorly and inconsistently. 
Part A calls for state legislatures to address contradictions and ambiguities 
in the LLC statutes on the books. Part B calls for judges to faithfully apply pro-
visions of the applicable LLC statues providing for waiver of fiduciary duties, 
arguing for judicial fidelity for policy reasons specific to both statutory con-
struction and to the nature of contracts in general and as they operate in the 
LLC context. 
                                                        
384  Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, New Mexico, 
Washington, and Wisconsin. 
385  See Merrick v. Cummin, 919 A.2d 495, 499–500 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007). But see Hartley 
v. Boyd, No. X02CV034004679, 2008 WL 442142, at *11 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 04, 2008) 
(reiterating that fiduciary duties cannot be waived and applying the Zeller test with no dis-
cussion of Merrick). 
386  Pointer v. Castellani, 918 N.E.2d 805, 819–21 (Mass. 2009). 
387  See Gotham Partners, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P., 817 A.2d 160, 168 (Del. 
2002). 
388  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (2016). 
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A. Legislative Implications 
Legislatures seeking to promote business and discourage unnecessary liti-
gation should ensure clear guidance on waiver of fiduciary duties in their LLC 
act. They should avoid forcing courts to reconcile multiple sections of the LLC 
act to infer an endorsement of a waiver (e.g., the indirect approach), and they 
should avoid the use of vague terms such as “manifestly unreasonable” (e.g., 
the Colorado LLC Act389). A provision directly allowing waiver is also prefera-
ble to only an exculpation provision, unless the legislature does in fact intend 
only to provide relief from monetary damages while preserving equitable rem-
edies. 
State legislatures can facilitate value-added investment by providing cer-
tainty as to the enforceability of waivers of fiduciary duties in their LLC stat-
utes. States compete to attract business associations by the most efficient com-
mercial laws390 and stand to benefit tremendously from clear rules allowing 
broad waiver of fiduciary duties. It is not the proper role of the state to attempt 
to serve as a moral arbiter of how sophisticated parties define their own, freely 
entered business relationships. Sophisticated parties are better equipped than 
the state legislature to plan value-maximizing transactions and to protect them-
selves from rapacious behavior by the other party (including balancing the risk 
of such behavior versus the cost of taking protective steps). 
Even opponents of enforcing waivers of fiduciary duties recognize that 
there is a call for flexibility through private ordering.391 While both legislatures 
and courts suffer from institutional problems of “generality and stasis,” and 
create rules that tend to stay past their welcome,392 legislatures are best suited 
to answering that call. Judicial decisions have been slow in coming;393 legisla-
tive change has not.394 The availability and representative heuristics are less 
problematic for legislatures than courts: legislatures see all stages of the LLC 
lifecycle, not just disputes and failures. Further, the LLC is a creation of statute, 
not common law; that is, the “ancient judicial prerogative of making the law” 
has been abrogated.395 
                                                        
389  COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-108(1.5) (West 2006). 
390  See, e.g., Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the 
Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 254–62 (1977). See generally John Armour et al., Is 
Delaware Losing Its Cases?, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 605 (2012). 
391  See Miller supra note 8, at 613 (“There is clearly a call for legislation that permits a con-
siderable degree of contractual modification.”). 
392  Butler & Ribstein, supra note 16, at 57. 
393  See supra Part II. 
394  At least five states (Idaho, California, New Jersey, North Carolina, and Kansas) have 
amended or replaced the provisions in their respective LLC Acts pertaining to waiver of fi-
duciary duties. 
395  ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL 
TEXTS 3–4 (2012) (“Such distortion of texts that have been adopted by the people’s elected 
representatives is undemocratic. In an age when democratically prescribed texts (such as 
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B. Judicial Implications 
Courts should apply the plain meaning of the statutory text. The legisla-
ture’s intent in enacting a statute is neither discernable nor, frankly, anything 
other than a fiction.396 Statutes represent a truce between warring factions—
courts should not advance the interests of a single side of that debate.397 Judges 
should interpret statutes much as they do contracts, by examining the words of 
the statute simultaneously and in conjunction with each other, without adding 
or subtracting unnecessary implied terms.398 A “canon of construction” in favor 
of fiduciary duties has no place where the text of the statute and the agreement 
provide for modification.399 Judges are not businesspeople, and their core com-
petency is not evaluating ex ante decision-making post hoc. It is instructive that 
the judges with presumably the greatest understanding of business, the chancel-
lors of the Delaware Court of Chancery, are quick to uphold business deci-
sions.400 Courts in all states will look beyond the agreement when principles of 
equity are implicated, but the specialized Court of Chancery is much less apt to 
do so. Unfortunately, even if judges in some of these states do strive to follow 
the text, some statutes are so ambiguous or vague that it may not be entirely 
clear that a waiver should be enforced. 
A breach of fiduciary duty cannot occur unless there is a fiduciary relation-
ship between the parties.401 If a contractual waiver prevents that relationship 
from forming, then there can be no future breach. Traditionally fiduciary duties 
are created when one party is in a position of dominance over another party.402 
                                                                                                                                
[LLC Acts]) are the rule, the judge’s principle function is to give those texts their fair mean-
ing.”). 
396  See id. at 369–96. 
397  See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 63 (1988) (noting that statutes are “born of compromise”). 
398  See id. at 60 (arguing that statutes are public documents that “should be read, like a con-
tractual offer, to find their reasonable import”). See generally SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 
399. 
399  See Butler & Ribstein, supra note 16, at 31 (criticizing such a recommendation). Several 
states (e.g., Delaware, New Mexico) explicitly provide for giving “maximum effect to the 
principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of operating agreements of limited 
liability companies,” but such provisions are superfluous if proper principles of statutory in-
terpretation are followed. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-19-65 (West Supp. 2015); accord JOHN M. 
CUNNINGHAM & VERNON R. PROCTOR, DRAFTING LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY OPERATING 
AGREEMENTS 2–13 (3d ed. 2016) (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b) (2016)). 
400  On at least one occasion the Delaware Supreme Court has shown itself to be more skep-
tical than the Court of Chancery. See Gotham Partners, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty Partners, 
L.P., 817 A.2d 160, 168 (Del. 2001) (stating in dicta that an elimination of fiduciary duties in 
the LP agreement would not be enforced). 
401  See, e.g., Kaplan v. O.K. Techs., L.L.C., 675 S.E.2d 133, 141 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (“[I]t 
is fundamental that a fiduciary relationship must exist between the parties in order for a 
breach of fiduciary duty to occur.” (alteration in original) (citing Branch v. High Rock Real-
ty, Inc., 565 S.E.2d 248, 253 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002))). 
402  Arthur B. Laby, Resolving Conflicts of Duty in Fiduciary Relationships, 54 AM. U. L. 
REV. 75, 77 n.2 (2004) (“Fiduciary duties are said to arise as a constraint on opportunism 
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Absent undue influence or some other factor that would defeat the contract, this 
relationship does not exist at the time of contract formation. Hence, a contrac-
tual waiver of fiduciary duties should be viewed through the prism of a contrac-
tual relationship, not of a fiduciary relationship.403 “The general rule of contract 
law is that if a written contract exists, the parties’ rights are controlled by that 
contract.”404 
Freedom of contract should be promoted as it leads to economic efficiency 
gains. Sophisticated parties are better equipped to protect their own interests 
than are judges; they possess greater knowledge of business in general and of 
the transaction at hand, and have a larger stake in its result.405 Non-
sophisticated parties can protect themselves contractually (the waiver is, after 
all, an opt-out provision) or through more protective entity forms such as a 
partnership or corporation (especially in states providing additional protections 
to shareholders in a closely held corporation). If fiduciary duties are merely a 
response to the difficulties of addressing such obligations by contract,406 then it 
follows that if parties are able to address those obligations in their contract, the 
need for court-imposed fiduciary duties is not present. “[W]hen parties fail to 
address a future state of the world—and they necessarily will because contract-
ing is costly and human knowledge imperfect—then the elimination of fiduci-
ary duties implies an agreement that losses should remain where they fall.”407 
Freedom of contract also helps provide the certainty that businesspeople so 
desperately seek from the law. 
Even setting aside the general benefits of freedom of contract discussed 
above, enforcing contractual provisions eliminating fiduciary duties is benefi-
cial, particularly given the tremendous variety in management structures facili-
tated by the LLC.408 A waiver of the duty of loyalty may allow parties to recruit 
members with significant expertise but conflicting interests. A notable example 
                                                                                                                                
presented to the fiduciary by virtue of the power or authority he receives from the princi-
pal.”). 
403  See Elizabeth S. Miller & Thomas E. Rutledge, The Duty of Finest Loyalty and Reason-
able Decisions: The Business Judgment Rule in Unincorporated Business Organizations?, 
30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 343, 380–87 (2005) (arguing for the use of a contract model rather than a 
fiduciary model for applying waivers of fiduciary duty). 
404  Mitchell Co. v. Campus, No. 08-0342-KD-C, 2009 WL 3527744, at *7 (S.D. Ala. Oct. 
23, 2009). 
405  It should be presumed that parties entering into a flexible, contractual business associa-
tion such as an LLC are sophisticated and in a better position than a court to make decisions 
in their own best interests. See supra Introduction. 
406  See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5, at 426 (arguing the “duty of loyalty is a re-
sponse to the impossibility of writing contracts completely specifying the parties’ obliga-
tions”). 
407  Lonergan v. EPE Holdings L.L.C., 5 A.3d 1008, 1018 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
408  Cf. Miller, supra note 4, at 140 (criticizing the bifurcated approach of the Model Busi-
ness Corporation Act as “ill suited to the multiplicity of management structures housed in the 
LLC”). 
PACE - 16 NEV. L.J. 1085 - FINAL 6/20/2016  5:58 PM 
Summer 2016] FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN LLCS 1137 
is the famous teaching case McConnell v. Hunt Sports Enterprises.409 A waiver 
can provide a seal of approval for a specific relationship planned between a 
member and the LLC. For example, a wholesaler organized as an LLC may 
plan to rent its warehouse from one of the investors.410 Or a businessperson that 
runs several LLCs in which they have also invested may do so through a man-
agement company. A waiver of the duty of loyalty can also be used to protect a 
managing member who also manages other LLCs from being exposed to una-
voidable conflicts.  
A waiver of the duty of care could be used to mitigate uncertainty over 
whether the business judgment rule or some higher standard will be applied.411 
Parties may wish to address this uncertainty and leverage the nuances of exist-
ing case law by setting fiduciary duties to be equivalent to those that apply in 
corporation law. The Delaware Supreme Court upheld such a provision, for an 
LP agreement, in Gotham Partners.412 Parties may want to contractually protect 
themselves at the outset from an investor with a history of litigiousness.413 A 
waiver may be part of an agreement not to bring a claim over an earlier dis-
pute.414 
A narrowly tailored waiver of fiduciary duties may also serve to protect 
management of an L3C415 organized to serve a social mission, as well as pro-
vide a return on investment, from liability for foregoing the highest possible 
financial returns in order to advance its social mission. Absent contractual or 
statutory protection, there is a risk that operating an LLC for a stated purpose 
other than to maximize member value may expose managing members to suit 
for breaching their fiduciary duties. This may be particularly worthwhile in 
                                                        
409  See McConnell v. Hunt Sport Enters., 725 N.E.2d 1193 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999) (enforcing 
an operating agreement in which the members had waived the duty of loyalty in order to se-
cure the participation of a current investor in multiple professional sports franchises that 
might have been construed as competing with the LLC). 
410  Cf. Hibbs v. Berger, 430 S.W.3d 296, 316–18 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014). 
411  See Madden, supra note 36 (positing the law around fiduciary duties in “five major 
states”—Delaware, Massachusetts, California, New York, and Illinois—is much less clear 
for LLCs than for corporations). 
412  See Gotham Partners, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P., 817 A.2d 160, 163–64 
(Del. 2002). 
413  See, e.g., Kahn v. Icahn, No. CIV. A.15916, 1998 WL 832629, at *1 n.1 (Del. Ch. Nov. 
12, 1998) (noting that the defendant’s brief identifies the plaintiffs as named plaintiffs in at 
least thirteen lawsuits alleging improper conduct). 
414  See, e.g., USAT Reorganization L.L.C. v. Writer, No. D043230, 2004 WL 2538848, at 
*16 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 10, 2004). 
415  “A ‘low-profit limited liability company’ (L3C) is a new, hybrid business form which 
can leverage foundations’ program-related investments to access trillions of dollars of mar-
ket-driven capital for ventures with modest financial prospects, but the possibility of major 
social impact.” Marc J. Lane, L3Cs Hold Key to Solving State’s Social Woes, CRAIN’S CHI. 
BUS. (Aug. 9, 2008), http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20080809/ISSUE07/1000 
30399 [https://perma.cc/QA3H-VC5V]. The addition of goals other than profit-maximization 
creates uncertainties as to the application of traditional models of fiduciary duty. 
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states that do not have a constituency statute election.416 However, courts in 
those states may be leery of a contractual provision that attempts to perform the 
function of a constituency statute election that the legislature of that state has 
chosen not to enact. Even in states with constituency statute election, a narrow-
ly tailored waiver of this sort could be used as an additional layer of protection. 
In addition to this statutory uncertainty, the law of fiduciary obligation is 
“situation-specific.”417 Thus, a broad ability to modify fiduciary duties allows 
parties to tailor fiduciary duties to meet their specific needs and circumstances. 
Potential active participants in an investment are very concerned about personal 
liability—hence the ubiquity of indemnity clauses in corporate bylaws, offic-
ers’ and directors’ insurance, and indemnity clauses in employment contracts. 
In addition, a party desiring to form an LLC in a state whose LLC act does not 
provide default fiduciary duties can reduce uncertainty by defining fiduciary 
duties in the operating agreement. The Supreme Court of Delaware has en-
forced a provision in an LP agreement applying the entire fairness standard to 
actions by the general partner in regards to the limited partners.418 
Going beyond the value of the above, the ability to include such measures 
in the contract can be a powerful negotiation tool. A waiver might sufficiently 
assuage the concerns about personal liability of a party that would not other-
wise participate in the LLC. Such a waiver may be the only avenue around 
deadlock over terms. Default fiduciary duties can lower the cost to negotiate, 
and the ability to opt out of those default terms can do the same.419 The tradi-
tional concern, that fiduciary duties are needed to protect a weak party from a 
party in a position of dominance,420 is not present at the time the bargain is 
struck. Typically, parties can walk away from the deal. If a weak party truly 
does need to be protected from a party in a position of dominance as a contrac-
tual relationship is being formed, then the contractual doctrine of unconsciona-
bility may apply. Fiduciary duties also shift risk to the managers of the compa-
ny, increasing costs.421 A waiver can be a negotiated attempt to shift that risk 
                                                        
416  There are nineteen such states (including the District of Columbia) as of 2009: Alabama, 
Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Kansas, Michi-
gan, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, 
Texas, Utah, Washington, and West Virginia. See Anthony Bisconti, The Double Bottom 
Line: Can Constituency Statutes Protect Socially Responsible Corporations Stuck in Revlon 
Land?, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 765, 768 n.13 (2009). Eight of those nineteen are test states dis-
cussed in this article. “Constituency statutes permit board members to consider nonshare-
holder interests when exercising their corporate decision-making authority.” Id. at 767. 
417  Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 
DUKE L.J. 879, 879 (1988). 
418  Gotham Partners v. Hallwood Realty Partners, 817 A.2d 160, 167–68 (Del. 2002). 
419  Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 
STAN. L. REV. 271, 291 (1986). 
420  See DeMott, supra note 417, at 915. 
421  Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 249; see also Butler & Ribstein, supra note 16, at 30 (posit-
ing that managers are poor risk-bearers); Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Judicial Review of Fiduciary 
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back to the investors in return for decreased compensation required by the 
managers. 
A complete waiver of fiduciary duties does not quite create the kind of 
Wild, Wild West business environment the anti-contractarians have implied.422 
Other protections exist for the parties, notably the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing present in all contracts.423 The implied covenant is intend-
ed to provide a remedy for just the sort of nefarious skullduggery about which 
the anti-contractarians express so much concern, without being so over-
inclusive as to prevent bargained-for activities. 
VI. MICRO IMPLICATIONS 
The substantial uncertainty due to very limited directly applicable case law 
and the lack of support for a clear analysis based on either the statutory text or 
by analogy to LP case law will have significant practical implications. Part A 
addresses implications for LLC litigation. Part B addresses implications for 
transaction planning. 
A. Litigation Consequences 
It should be expected that contractual provisions providing for the waiver 
of fiduciary duties will be held invalid in some of the test states discussed. This 
may be exacerbated by a certain amount of confusion over what exactly the ap-
plicable fiduciary duties are. Waivers may not be enforced due to judicial error 
or due to a judge hostile to contracting out of fiduciary duties—whether in gen-
eral or in response to a “hard case” where it appears that one party has used the 
waiver to take advantage of a less sophisticated party. 
For judges holding waivers of fiduciary duty invalid, there are two primary 
available paths of rationalization. First, judges may do so through their inter-
                                                                                                                                
Decisionmaking—Some Theoretical Perspectives, 80 NW. U.L. REV. 1, 27–29 (1985) (dis-
cussing the costs associated with fiduciary duties). 
422  See, e.g., Miller, supra note 4, at 139 (referencing a “devil-may-care” standard (quoting 
Gelfman v. Weeden Inv’rs, L.P., 859 A.2d 89, 114 (Del. Ch. 2004))). 
423  See JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 11.38(a), at 475 (5th 
ed. 2003) (citing Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 188 N.E. 163, 167 (N.Y. 
1933)); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a, d (AM. LAW INST. 
1981) (“Good faith performance or enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to an 
agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the other party; it 
excludes a variety of types of conduct characterized as involving ‘bad faith’ because they 
violate community standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness. . . . Subterfuges and 
evasions violate the obligation of good faith in performance even though the actor believes 
his conduct to be justified. But the obligation goes further: bad faith may be overt or may 
consist of inaction, and fair dealing may require more than honesty. . . . [T]he following 
types [of bad faith] are among those which have been recognized in judicial decisions: eva-
sion of the spirit of the bargain, lack of diligence and slacking off, willful rendering of im-
perfect performance, abuse of a power to specify terms, and interference with or failure to 
cooperate in the other party’s performance.”). 
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pretation of the applicable LLC statute. A vague statute (e.g., Colorado’s) or an 
ambiguous statute (e.g., California’s) will allow a court to argue that principles 
of common law should be applied. They can then rely on this interpretation to 
hold a waiver void as against public policy or ineffective. Second, judges may 
rely on contract interpretation to hold waivers of fiduciary duty invalid. For ex-
ample, they may read fiduciary duties into an LLC operating agreement where 
they should not be under the objective theory of contract. Alternatively, they 
may read a provision that should effectively waive fiduciary duties in an overly 
narrow manner so as to not apply to the specific facts before the court. Given 
the expected bias against waivers of fiduciary duties, even judges unwilling to 
openly hold such provisions ineffective are more likely to construe them nar-
rowly. An example may be a waiver of the duty of loyalty; the duty of disclo-
sure is a component of the duty of loyalty,424 but a court may be tempted to find 
that a straightforward waiver of the “duty of loyalty” does not also waive the 
duty of disclosure.425 
Courts may construe the implied contractual covenants of good faith and 
fair dealing broadly in order to defeat an attempt to waive fiduciary duties.426 A 
judge sympathetic to the plaintiff may wrongly interpret the implied covenant 
of good faith to prohibit self-dealing.427 However, Delaware courts have clearly 
stated that “[a] party does not act in bad faith by relying on contract provisions 
for which that party bargained where doing so simply limits advantages to an-
other party.”428 
Courts hostile to fiduciary duty waivers may also use procedure to avoid 
having to apply substantive law with which they disagree. Choice of law provi-
sions might be defeated through manipulation of conflicts of law doctrine. De-
rivative suits might be found to fail standing requirements.429 There is a danger 
of a court applying the public policy of its state to avoid enforcing a waiver un-
                                                        
424  See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS & LLCS 146 (2004) (“[A]n obli-
gation to disclose material facts is part and parcel of the duty of loyalty.”). 
425  But see Ledford v. Smith, 618 S.E.2d 627, 636 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that the 
member had no duty to disclose a business opportunity because the duty of loyalty had been 
waived and the action did not fall into the direct competition caveat in the waiver). 
426  But see Cincinnati SMSA Ltd. P’ship v. Cincinnati Bell Cellular Sys. Co., 708 A.2d 989, 
991–94 (Del. 1998) (stressing the covenant of good faith has only a very narrow scope). 
427  See Miller, supra note 8, at 597 (citing ROBERT A. HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF 
CONTRACT LAW 145 (1997) (arguing that the covenant of good faith embeds “community 
standards” in contracts)). But see Lonergan v. EPE Holdings L.L.C., 5 A.3d 1008, 1018 
(Del. Ch. 2010) (“When an LP agreement eliminates fiduciary duties as part of a detailed 
contractual governance scheme, Delaware courts should be all the more hesitant to resort to 
the implied covenant.”). 
428  Nemec v. Shrader, 991 A.2d 1120, 1128 (Del. 2010). 
429  See, e.g., Morris v. Hennon & Brown Props., L.L.C., No. 1:07CV780, 2008 WL 
2704292, at *4–6 (M.D.N.C. July 3, 2008) (finding a lack of standing and refusing to predict 
whether a North Carolina state court would enforce the waiver in question). 
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der another state’s laws.430 A federal court may cite a lack of state court prece-
dent in refusing to enforce a waiver431 or even to broach the issue.432 
The increased likelihood that a waiver will not be enforced encourages a 
party that has borne the brunt of shifting circumstances to litigate rather than 
renegotiate.433 Normally this party might best be able to address changed cir-
cumstances by negotiating with the other parties to redefine their relationship, 
perhaps modifying contractual fiduciary duties to reflect a new, weakened posi-
tion. The possibility of an escape from the benefit of the bargain through litiga-
tion, however, limits how much the weakened party will be willing to pay for a 
renegotiated deal. This could create a hold-up problem leading to an otherwise 
value-added transaction being scuttled because one party feels that they can ex-
pect more from litigation than from any negotiated agreement. The uncertainty 
of enforcement of a waiver can also increase the probability of litigation. Par-
ties with drastically different estimates of their ability to prevail in court will be 
unlikely to renegotiate successfully. 
It is likely that the development of case law in this area will be stifled and 
only grow very slowly due to a limited number of cases and, in particular, bind-
ing precedent. Many operating agreements, particularly for the types of com-
plex LLCs most likely to take advantage of the ability to contract around de-
fault rules, may be interpreted by courts outside of the state in which the LLC 
was formed434 or by federal courts.435 This diffuse pattern of litigation will di-
minish the reach of individual decisions unless decided by the highest court of 
the state. Parties will be unwilling to bargain for a waiver of fiduciary duties ex 
ante due to uncertainty over the enforceability of such provisions faced with 
hostile courts, ambiguous statutes, or both, thus leaving no waiver to be ana-
lyzed in future litigation. Courts in states that do not define fiduciary duties by 
statute can be expected to be called upon regularly to decide what fiduciary du-
ties apply to an LLC, at the same time building case law on what may or may 
not be construed as an effective waiver. Courts in states that set default fiduci-
ary duties, on the other hand, are less likely to be asked to apply fiduciary du-
ties in conjunction with LLC operating agreements. This delay is a matter of 
                                                        
430  See Merrick v. Cummin, 919 A.2d 495, 498 n.3 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007) (enforcing a 
waiver of fiduciary duties but applying Connecticut law to a Delaware corporation under a 
“fundamental policy” exception). 
431  See, e.g., In re Allentown Ambassadors, Inc., 361 B.R. 422, 461 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (relying 
on North Carolina corporate law to predict that a North Carolina state court would not en-
force the waiver in question). 
432  See, e.g., Morris, 2008 WL 2704292, at *4–6 (finding a lack of standing and refusing to 
predict whether a North Carolina state court would enforce the waiver in question). 
433  See Lonergan v. EPE Holdings L.L.C., 5 A. 2d 1008, 1018 n.4 (Del. Ch. 2010) (noting 
that relational contracts—such as an LP agreement or LLC operating agreement—provide 
abundant opportunity for renegotiation). 
434  See, e.g., Kira, Inc. v. All Star Maint., No. A-03-CA-950 LY, 2006 WL 2193006, at *5–
6 (W.D. Tex. July 31, 2006) (interpreting Nevada law). 
435  See, e.g., Armour et al., supra note 390, at 610 (examining empirical evidence showing 
Delaware state courts losing litigation “market share,” in particular to federal courts). 
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some concern; the law of business associations cannot evolve without the de-
velopment of case law.436 
B. Transaction Planning Considerations 
The other significant concern is that the uncertainty over the enforceability 
of waivers of fiduciary duty will lead planning attorneys to advise against what 
would otherwise be value added contractual terms relieving the parties of their 
fiduciary duties. Another consideration is that due to the paucity of case law in 
this area, a court from another state may have to apply the law of the state in 
which the LLC is incorporated without the benefit of precedent. Even after that 
decision, there would be no binding precedent in the state of incorporation be-
cause the only application of its law was by a court in another state. Even 
where precedential case law exists, the multiple avenues available to a court 
seeking to avoid enforcing a waiver of fiduciary duties leave enforcement of a 
waiver under consideration uncertain. 
Businesspeople thrive on certainty and will avoid contracting for terms that 
add uncertainty into their businesses. In a handful of states—Delaware, Geor-
gia, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Nevada, North Carolina, and Texas—
planning attorneys can rely on positive LLC precedents. Even in states with 
mixed precedents—Connecticut and Massachusetts—and in states without on-
point precedent, forcing a planning attorney to rely on the statutory language—
Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Missis-
sippi, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Washington, and Wisconsin—the busi-
ness needs of the parties can be met by a well-tailored waiver that will capture 
the bargain of the parties while avoiding unnecessary language that might lead 
a court to void an entire provision. The Colorado LLC statute only makes very 
limited allowances for waiver.Parties can seek jurisdiction in what they per-
ceive to be a friendly venue, either by incorporating the LLC in the chosen state 
or through a choice of law provision in the operating agreement. States that 
prove hostile to waivers of fiduciary duty can be expected to lose “market 
share” in the competition for LLC filings to states more friendly to contractual-
ly defined relationships. Parties can also attempt to address limitations on 
waivers through other provisions of the operating agreement.437 
                                                        
436  See RIBSTEIN, supra note 3, at 33 (“The evolution of business associations depends on the 
development of case law and interstate acceptance of new terms.”); see also id. at 102 
(“[T]he value of business association statutes reflects the network consisting of materials 
such as cases, legal forms, treatises-that assists in interpretation and application of these stat-
utes.”). 
437  For example, by complementing an exculpatory provision in a state only expressly al-
lowing such a provision with a provision limiting remedies to monetary damages. 
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CONCLUSION 
State laws can create a business environment more conducive to invest-
ment by entrepreneurs in new ventures by providing certainty and flexibility. 
To this end, waivers of fiduciary duties by LLC members should be broadly 
and clearly allowed. Courts should give parties to a contract the benefit of the 
bargain of that contract. Courts should enforce contracts both good and bad (or, 
perhaps a better way to state it: courts should not make judgments regarding 
whether a contract is “good” or “bad”). Doing so will better address the inter-
ests in businesspersons in forming LLCs and better effect the intent of legisla-
tures in providing for the formations of LLCs. In the states without relevant 
case law, courts can send a strong positive message to the business community 
by enforcing a waiver of fiduciary duty when the question arises. Courts inter-
preting the law of states with negative precedent or relying on precedent from 
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